A common conception in the legal literature holds that in a given country, the law in force is to be understood against the background of shared beliefs about justice in that particular country. If that conception holds true, the applicable civil law in a particular country should reflect the shared views on ‘civil justice’ within that country and, as a result, citizens should reveal a preference for domestic civil law over the civil law of another country for a given case. In this research we empirically investigated to what extent the applicable law in particular cases corresponds to actual beliefs about what is seen as just in those situations. Does Dutch liability law in a particular case correspond with what citizens in the Netherlands consider to be just in that case? And does the applicable English liability law correspond to what English people consider fair in that case?
In an experiment we compared Dutch and English respondents’ views on the fairness of legal solutions in three different, hypothetical cases where Dutch and English legal solutions to the same case would diverge. We find that at the aggregate level, respondents indeed reveal a preference for the legal solution that is applicable in their own country, regardless of whether the different legal solutions are presented as applicable or not: Dutch respondents prefer Dutch civil solutions and English respondents prefer English civil solutions. However, we also observe differences between cases that make strong conclusions about a structural correspondence premature.

High-impact incidents, such as (natural) disasters, severe (traffic) accidents, and exposure to (war) violence, may have severe psychological consequences, both for direct and indirect victims. Such consequences may qualify for financial compensation. However, some victims malinger their psychological status to get compensated for damages they have not suffered. This type of fraudulent behavior costs insurance companies and publicly funded compensation services enormous amounts of money and may eventually make compensation unaffordable. To prevent this from occurring, it is argued that lawyers who need to decide upon victims’ claims for compensation should call in independent experts to evaluate the genuineness of victims’ reported psychological symptoms by administrating a malingering detection test. To enable correct interpretation of the outcome of such a test, the base rate problem is extensively discussed. In short, this problem means that correct test interpretation in individual cases depends on the prevalence of malingering in the population to which a victim belongs. Finally, several counter arguments for the standard assessment of malingering by independent experts are discussed.