Whether and under which conditions restorative justice can be applied to cases of corporate violence is explored starting from the phenomenon of corporate violence, defined as acts committed by corporations in the course of their regular activities but with harmful consequences for people’s health. Specific characteristics of different types of corporate violence are presented, as well as victims’ needs, experiences and expectations. The applicability of restorative justice, but also the need of its rethinking, is discussed through an analysis of the role of its key actors and the concepts of participation and restoration.

In this article attention is paid to the thoughts and feelings which underlie criminal law and restorative justice, as well as the question whether those thoughts and feelings have to be regarded as rational or irrational. For this purpose, the author has firstly examined the relationship between thinking and feeling from the perspective of the so-called cognitive emotion theory as put forth by the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum and the Dutch philosopher Mirjam van Reijen. In addition, this contribution also addresses the ideas of the Stoics, Spinoza and Schopenhauer, since the aforementioned theory goes back on the ideas of these philosophers. These philosophers depart from the view on man and world in which interconnectedness plays an important role – as the opposite of separateness. This view which reflects the mystic-religious perspective on man and world forms an important connecting thread in this article, as this turns out to have direct consequences for the idea about the (ir)rationality of certain thoughts and feelings, as well as for the (ir)rationality of criminal law and restorative justice. Special attention is paid to emotions that are relevant within the context of criminal law and restorative justice – which include anger, resentment, hatred, fear and compassion. After having explained – on the basis of the cognitive emotion theory – how thinking and feeling relate to each other and which thoughts and feelings – on the basis of the perspective of interconnectedness – have to be considered as (ir)rational, the article examines whether punishment is (ir)rational and whether the regular theories which legitimate punishment (i.e. retribution and prevention theories) are ‘rationalities of something irrational’. Furthermore, it is assessed whether the thoughts and feelings behind restorative justice are (ir)rational. The article concludes with a suggestion in which the main findings of this contribution are summarized, in order to stimulate discussion.

COSA (Circles of Support and Accountability) is an innovative approach to sex offender management in the community for offenders with a medium to high risk of recidivism. COSA was first developed in Canada in 1994 and aim at prevention of recidivism and re-integration of sex offenders. COSA are formed by local volunteers, who assist the sex offender by offering support, monitoring and accountability. They are supported by professionals. COSA has been introduced in the Netherlands in 2009 by The Dutch Probation Organisation (Reclassering Nederland) and the Centre of Public Safety of Avans University of Applied Science. The evaluation of the pilot shows that COSA can be successfully implemented in the Netherlands as well. Living up to the high quality standards is a complex task and involves continuous monitoring, evaluation and adjustment.

Topical developments regarding the use of restorative justice in the Netherlands are discussed. Several initiatives have been taken, showing a genuine interest in the benefits of the use of restorative justice. However, there are underlying risks for a managerial use of restorative justice. Momentarily Dutch criminal justice policy features a shift towards settlement by the Public Prosecution, implying a use of restorative justice in the context of consensual settlement. However, there are no signs directing towards an intrinsic interest for the concept of restorative justice by the criminal justice authorities. Notwithstanding the legislator having started a fundamental revision of the Dutch Code of Penal Procedure, there are no intentions known to acknowledge restorative justice arrangements to be part of the regular penal procedures and sanctions. Nevertheless, incorporating the use of restorative justice arrangements requires a systematic implementation of restorative justice arrangements.

This article aims at grounding and defining the role of volunteers in restorative justice practices. It starts from the observation that processes of institutionalization tend to make the role of volunteering citizens in restorative justice programmes doubtful and superfluous. These doubts are strengthened by the fact that the link between restorative justice values and the importance of working with volunteers is too easily assumed. Can we offer some well-founded arguments to back up this assumption and to outline what key roles volunteers can play? Several conceptions of restorative justice might be explored. This contribution examines the maximalist view, as developed by Lode Walgrave in his latest book Restorative Justice, Self-interest and Responsible Citizenship. The article critically asks if and how his conception demands an active role for volunteers within restorative justice practices. The paper develops its arguments on the basis of three key concepts in Walgraves model: (1) his definition of restorative justice; (2) his notion of crime; and (3) his socio-ethical intuition of common self-interest.

This article departs from a crime prevention perspective following the definition of crime prevention as adopted by the European Union Crime Prevention Network (EUCPN). This approach handles a broad notion of community involvement in crime prevention, including non-judicial measures and models of intervention. Through its participatory approaches, restorative justice has the potential of mobilising and reinforcing social capital and, therefore, of contributing to effective crime prevention and control. The community oriented approach is illustrated by the model of crime prevention and its possible connection to restorative justice as being developed in Hungary and promoted through various actions of the EUCPN.

Hans Boutellier is giving a panoramic overview of important changes in society. As worked out in his recent book De improvisatiemaatschappij (The improvisation society) he describes that society has evaluated into a network society in which social ordering is primarily a matter of self-organizing mechanisms. The aim for self-ordering would be a possibility for a further growth of restorative practices, but at the same time we are dealing with a penal-populist culture. In that culture citizenship, dialogue and self-ordering are suspect and – paradoxically – safety is expected to be delivered only by the state.

Conceptions of what ethics are about inform the expectations one has when consulting ethicians. To illustrate this Pattyn shows how two different conceptions of ethics generate two opposite expectations. One could either consider ethics as a specific disciplinary domain that can evaluate and judge decisively about a certain phenomenon on the basis of fundamental criteria, or see ethics as the study of the ways in which a phenomenon – such as restorative justice – can appear as a morally accountable praxis in a specific cultural setting or ‘situated understanding’. Pattyn argues that only the second view makes sense and discusses several types of settings and understandings in relation to various types of judicial settlement. The conclusion following from the analysis is that the ambitions of restorative justice amount to an everyday moral strategy to heal the damaged cohesion of social groups after a transgression and to offer offender and victim alike the opportunity to rehabilitate.

There is a natural alliance between the ambitions of prison chaplaincy and those of restorative justice in the sense that in both approaches (coping with) responsibility and guilt by offenders are important issues and mechanisms at the same time. Both share a relational concept of crime, consider the evil deed as occasion to start a dialogue to examine responsibility, stress the importance of process and bi-lateral partiality with both the victim and the offender. Coping with guilt and making it productive requires that communication with the offender reaches the deeper and more intimate levels of giving meaning to the criminal offence committed, self, others, past and future. For this communication the context should be open and fundamentally loving in a Christian sense, leading the way to a liberation from guilt once it is thoroughly known and accepted. At that point guilt can be transformed into a constructive moral impetus in human relations.

This study revolves around the broad question: can religion prevent crime? In the first part the (possible) impact of religious faith on social behaviour (or the prevention of certain behaviours) is discussed. Respectively the following aspects are dealt with: religion as a source of activism, religion as protective factor to keep people from crime, and the impact of crime on tolerant or intolerant and forgiving or punitive attitudes. The second part deals with deliberately organized faith-based-interventions, intended to support and help inmates. The role of identity change via redemption narratives is examined, as well as the question how professionals and volunteers may stimulate rehabilitation and reintegration of (ex-)prisoners.

Renée Kool reageert op het artikel De komende emancipatie van het slachtoffer van Jan van Dijk.