Until recently, Dutch merchant ships could not rely on privately contracted maritime security staff to protect themselves against pirates. On the one hand, the argument prevailed that the State had to retain the monopoly on the use of force and, on the other hand, one also feared for the escalation of violence or international incidents. Nowadays, however, more and more European countries allow for the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board merchant ships. As a result, the Dutch Parliament has adopted a bill containing rules for the use of armed private security guards on board Dutch maritime merchant ships (Law to Protect Merchant Shipping 2019 (published in the Dutch official Gazette on June 7th, 2019)).
The author addresses the question whether because of the new law a level playing field will emerge with the Merchant Navies from the neighboring Flag States of Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain and Denmark, presenting a comparative analysis of their domestic legislation.
The Dutch law clearly regulates the use of force and the master has the final responsibility for everything that happens under his authority. In principle, the security guards may only apply violence as the master has determined that it is necessary. Innovative is that there is a reporting obligation whereby every incident should be reported with images and sound recordings. It seems, however, that the law is especially made to protect and secure and not necessarily to provide a solution for situations in which pirates come on board.
It is clear that the intention of the legislator is to leave the monopoly on the use of force in the hands of the State. However, the adoption of this law to protect merchant shipping could constitute a first step in enabling the use of force by other actors than the State, which in itself is groundbreaking. Before being able to go on this road, there are still countless political (mainly related to the sovereignty of a State) and legal challenges (mainly concerning the use of force and respect for human rights) to be addressed.

In the Netherlands, over the past 25 years mayors have had an increasing number of formal powers, based on administrative law, to fight against crime and disorder. Now, the Dutch mayors have the power to impose a restraining order, to close houses in case of drugs and/or drugs trade, or to decline a request for a permit when it might be used for illegal activities.
To implement these measures, the local government is highly dependent on (information provided by) the police. At this moment we do not have much information about this cooperation between local government and the police in the management of crime and disorder. This paper is based on an empirical study concerning this issue. It shows that the inter-organizational cooperation between local government and the police may differ strongly, however this cooperation still often depends on central factors and circumstances. An important factor is the (growing) distance between the police and local government in regard to the local approach of problems of crime and disorder. A significant number of local police officers concentrates mainly on the maintenance of law and order by criminal law enforcement instead of the implementation of administrative measures. As a result, local government is often unsatisfied about the contribution of the police. For example, the quality of the information provided by the police is often perceived as insufficient. In some cases local governments try to diminish the degree of interdependency with the police and to strengthen their own position in the local safety domain.

This article demonstrates the influence of intellectual debate in policy paradigm changes. In response to piracy around the Horn of Africa, Dutch naval forces have participated in NATO and EU counter piracy operations since 2008. Although successful, also self protection measures by the merchant ships are required to provide security to individual ships. Since 2008 Dutch ship owners have advocated to amend legislation to allow private armed security teams (PAST) for individual protection, similar to policies by most foreign countries. Because of sensitivities concerning the private use of arms, policymakers, politicians, stakeholders and advisors have circumvented the issue. Instead of addressing the question of self defense, the paradigm of state monopoly for violence and the state’s obligation to provide security, made individual protection by embarked military teams to develop as a governmental service at levels that turned out to be unachievable for the armed forces. This policy caused several types of friction. Currently, the only acceptable solution seems to be to allow PAST and legislation is being prepared accordingly. A successful paradigm change however can only be achieved if an adequate new paradigm is constructed by intellectual debate. (Hall, Visser & Hemerijck) So far this debate has been too limited in scope. Debate has been state centric and focused on legal views and regulation. To resolve friction, additional analysis of differing roles by the state and individual entrepreneurs is required. Such analysis argues that the state severely reduces individual protection and politicians decide on the fundamental question of self defense by ships at the high seas.

This article attempts to interpret and critically discuss the concept of incapacitation as a motive in the response to crime. Research shows that incapacitation – disabling or hindering people to commit offences – increasingly presents an important motive in the response to crime. This tendency is explored by several researchers in a new book titled Incapacitation: Trends and New Perspectives (Ashgate 2012). This tendency presents itself by the expansion of various modes of and grounds for detention, but also in the increase of other kinds of incapacitative measures, as well as in the fact that also administrative measures outside criminal law increasingly contain incapacitative elements. This tendency towards incapacitation of possible (re-)offenders can also be witnessed in contemporary politics. Examples discussed here are the intensive application of preventive custody, disqualifications, restraining orders accompanied by electronic monitoring, as well as administrative measures aimed at refusing certificates of good conduct or permits for specific commercial activities. It is argued that incapacitation often is not a proportionate and effective approach against crime. It appears to obscure the perspective on possibly more effective attempts to secure future behavior.