The operational leader, the ‘gold commander’, fulfils a crucial function in crisis- and disaster management in the Netherlands. He is held responsible for the total coordination of all collaborating emergency services and supports/advises the Mayor, the Commander in Chief. Unfortunately, this function has never been very effective in practise, as shown by many evaluations. From a scientific point of view, it is easy to understand why the operational leader cannot be effective in the Dutch crisis management organisation. The operational leader has no authorities and has been seated in an emergency operation centre far from the Mayor. This article examines why this issue has not been solved, despite 30 years of studying and adjusting the Dutch crisis management organisation. |
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Tijdschrift | Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid, Aflevering 4 2018 |
Trefwoorden | Historie, Operationeel leider, Bureaupolitiek, Beethovenfout voor samenwerking |
Auteurs | Bernard Groot en Ira Helsloot |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
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Tijdschrift | Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid, Aflevering 3 2018 |
Trefwoorden | blame games, crisis, resignation, local authority, mayor |
Auteurs | Sandra L. Resodihardjo, Marloes Meijer en Brendan J. Carroll |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
Following a crisis, questions are often raised about how this crisis could have happened and whether someone is to be blamed for the crisis or its bad management. The blame game can become fierce as actors try to avoid, shift or mitigate blame in order to stay in office. In 2014, a festival took place in Haaksbergen where a monster truck drove into the audience, killing three people and injuring many others. Not enough safety measures had been taken to prevent the tragedy. Many actors were to blame for that, including the local authority which had granted the permit. Other actors blamed for the events were the mayor, the monster truck driver, and the organization organizing the festival. In the end, the mayor of Haaksbergen resigned. Instead of becoming more accommodative in his response as his blame levels increased, the mayor continued to be quite defensive, stating that the permit would be granted again – even with today’s knowledge. As one council member stated it, one cannot defend something which cannot be defended. |
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Wethouders in de frontlijn: een studie naar de perceptie van en de omgang met persoonlijke bedreigingen |
Tijdschrift | Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid, Aflevering 3 2018 |
Trefwoorden | threats in politics, coping strategies, undue influence on politics, Q-methodology |
Auteurs | Diana Marijnissen en Emile Kolthoff |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
This contribution reports on a delimited part of a larger, exploratory study, the main question of which was: How do aldermen perceive threats, what are their behavioral intentions and what is the influence of threats on the process and the outcome of decision-making? This question was answered with the help of Q-methodology, semi-structured interviews and case studies. This article discusses the results of the Q-methodology and the semi-structured interviews. The case studies will be reported separately later on. Through the Q-methodology three patterns in perception were found in dealing with threats: ‘combative and decisive’, ‘vulnerable and thoughtful’ and ‘down-to-earth and accepting’. The interviews show that it usually concerns instrumental threats that are deliberately used to influence decision making, which usually take place in the private sphere and vary from verbal aggression to physical violence. Most threats come from individuals, but some come from groups, in some cases there is a relationship with criminals. In the cases reviewed, the consequences in the private sphere are far-reaching, there are indications for the influence on public functioning (from hardening to great caution). There is almost always a report, a fuss in the media can affect the authority of the official. |