The promises of Big Data, predictive policing and artificial intelligence hold a key position in the public debate for quite some time now. Optimists tell that it is possible to predict where criminal events will occur before they take place. This would implicate a major shift towards a crime and insecurity preventive society, feeding on our cultural longing for a secure future. Therefore we give algorithms and deep learning access to more and more aspects of our lives. But how realistic and desirable is the application of Big Data techniques in the area of security?
In this article we put focus on the research question ‘In which way can Big Data and predictive policing support good governance of security?’, that has led our study. By exploring the central concepts, the processes behind them and their results in the domain of public security, we conclude that there are only rather disappointing results from the application of these techniques: crime and insecurity have not dropped when the police and other organizations turned to Big Data techniques. Instead, many negative side effects occurred. We search for explanations in six central academic critiques on the application of these techniques in the area of security.
We have found several ways to guaranty principles of good governance in the application of Big Data techniques, but these require a firm paradigm shift on Big Data in general. The heuristics of security professionals should not be overshadowed by technological promises: the professional should always be in the loop, must understand the way predictions come into existence and must be able to correct flaws and bugs of (semi-)automated decisions. We conclude that safeguarding public security must remain human work in which Big Data techniques can assist.

Until recently, Dutch merchant ships could not rely on privately contracted maritime security staff to protect themselves against pirates. On the one hand, the argument prevailed that the State had to retain the monopoly on the use of force and, on the other hand, one also feared for the escalation of violence or international incidents. Nowadays, however, more and more European countries allow for the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board merchant ships. As a result, the Dutch Parliament has adopted a bill containing rules for the use of armed private security guards on board Dutch maritime merchant ships (Law to Protect Merchant Shipping 2019 (published in the Dutch official Gazette on June 7th, 2019)).
The author addresses the question whether because of the new law a level playing field will emerge with the Merchant Navies from the neighboring Flag States of Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain and Denmark, presenting a comparative analysis of their domestic legislation.
The Dutch law clearly regulates the use of force and the master has the final responsibility for everything that happens under his authority. In principle, the security guards may only apply violence as the master has determined that it is necessary. Innovative is that there is a reporting obligation whereby every incident should be reported with images and sound recordings. It seems, however, that the law is especially made to protect and secure and not necessarily to provide a solution for situations in which pirates come on board.
It is clear that the intention of the legislator is to leave the monopoly on the use of force in the hands of the State. However, the adoption of this law to protect merchant shipping could constitute a first step in enabling the use of force by other actors than the State, which in itself is groundbreaking. Before being able to go on this road, there are still countless political (mainly related to the sovereignty of a State) and legal challenges (mainly concerning the use of force and respect for human rights) to be addressed.

In the Netherlands, over the past 25 years mayors have had an increasing number of formal powers, based on administrative law, to fight against crime and disorder. Now, the Dutch mayors have the power to impose a restraining order, to close houses in case of drugs and/or drugs trade, or to decline a request for a permit when it might be used for illegal activities.
To implement these measures, the local government is highly dependent on (information provided by) the police. At this moment we do not have much information about this cooperation between local government and the police in the management of crime and disorder. This paper is based on an empirical study concerning this issue. It shows that the inter-organizational cooperation between local government and the police may differ strongly, however this cooperation still often depends on central factors and circumstances. An important factor is the (growing) distance between the police and local government in regard to the local approach of problems of crime and disorder. A significant number of local police officers concentrates mainly on the maintenance of law and order by criminal law enforcement instead of the implementation of administrative measures. As a result, local government is often unsatisfied about the contribution of the police. For example, the quality of the information provided by the police is often perceived as insufficient. In some cases local governments try to diminish the degree of interdependency with the police and to strengthen their own position in the local safety domain.