This contribution reports about a research in a medium-sized municipality on the possibilities of giving municipalities an instrument to determine at the earliest possible stage which neighborhoods are at (increased) risk of exposure to organized crime and its consequences. We are searching for indicators to measure that exposure to give direction to preventive measures. Our focus is on the erosion of structures and foundations of society as a result of activities of organized crime, eventually resulting in the infringement of the rule of law. It is therefore not about the phenomenon of organized crime itself, but about its effects on society. This requires clarification and measurability of the concept. In this first exploration, we focus on the following five manifestations of the effect of organized crime: The emergence of a subculture: not recognizing government authority; the emergence of takeover of power in the neighborhood; the emergence of vulnerable groups of citizens; the creation of the image: crime pays off; and the emergence of unfair competition.

The Dutch Regional Fire Services collectively aim at preventing fire, casualties and damage. The main activity is informing citizens about fire risks and the appropriate measures they can take. From both a political and social perspective, it is valuable to know what the return of the Community Fire Safety program is. One way to chart the return of the program is a comparison of the cost of, and society’s willingness-to-pay for, the program. To estimate this willingness-to-pay, this article applies the contingent valuation method to a national representative sample of 806 Dutch citizens. The results show that willingness-to-pay of an average Dutch household is estimated to be between € 25.00 and € 35.67 per year provided the Community Fire Safety program improves the fire safety by 10%. At the national level, this amounts to 200 – 270 million euro annually. This value is seven to ten times more than the approximate costs of the current Community Fire Safety program.

In measuring safety a difference appears to exist between ‘objectively measured safety’ and the subjective perception by the public. Objectively spoken the level of criminality in a neighbourhood may have gone down, but that doesn’t necessary mean that the people living there ‘feel equally safer’. Psychology gives a number of explanations for this phenomenon. For example, the knowledge, the differences in thinking styles and communication about safety with citizens play an important role. This should not be seen as a case of non-rational thinking, but rather of systematic irrationality. These people are not ‘dumb’, they have (sometimes hard-wired) ways of handling information about complex issues like safety that require them to take ‘mental shortcuts’ (heuristics) in order to estimate the risks they are exposed to. This paper will focus on some of the psychological laws that guide our risk perception and surprisingly enough, the ‘objective risk’ seems to be of relatively little importance if compared with other, more subjective factors. Many of the factors relate to the nature of information citizens are exposed to: a risk that this described in easy to imagine way leads to a different evaluation of that risk compared with a less conspicuous presentation. Also the level of expertise of the ‘receiving end’ must be taken into account. Lay-people have different ways to look at risks compared with experts in a certain domain. The discussion on how to improve safety is probably best served with a continuing debate between ‘rational, objective’ and ‘systematic irrational, subjective’ mental models, while recognising their respective strengths and weaknesses. These findings may assist policy makers in particular in the formulation of policy that, in addition to the security objective as such, also improves the perception of safety.