The ‘fear of crime’ is a buzzword among citizens, media, politicians and professionals by now. But the phenomenon seems to be as intangible as it is important. The struggle of professionals with this concept is the result of a too wide and self-evident problem definition. This article contains an alternative approach. The focus is on disturbed fear of crime: a negatively changed and problematically experienced fear of crime on the level of the neighborhood.
Through a review of the literature and previous research, we work towards this concept and apply it to the neighborhood of Kerckebosch in the municipality of Zeist in the Netherlands. As during 2014 the local quantitative indicators for ‘the fear of crime’ rose from 7% of the local population indicating to ‘sometimes feel unsafe’ to 22%, while the rest of the municipality remained quite stable. Additionally, several local professionals received complaints of multiple local inhabitants claiming to ‘feel unsafe’ in the neighborhood. Our research question was: What explanations for their ‘disturbed fear of crime’ do local inhabitants of the neighborhood Kerckebosch give?
It was highly plausible that this local rise of the fear in Kerckebosch was connected to the social re-engineering of the neighborhood, but the exact nature of the quantitative rise was unclear. Therefore, we have interviewed 25 local inhabitants. Qualitative analyses showed the local rise of ‘the fear of crime’ to be the result of: (I) physical characteristics of the neighborhood; (II) events of burglary and intimidation from the past; (III) the presence of loitering youths and – primarily – (VI) a backlash of social integration as a side effect of the social re-engineering of the neighborhood. These qualitative explanations to the observed quantitative discontinuity led to several policy advises, which were based on international effect studies.

Urban nightlife areas are widely renowned for their emotionally charged nature, affording greater opportunities for transgressions of social norms compared to daytime contexts. Yet, the ways nightlife consumers experience safety in the public spaces of nightlife areas has received limited attention in the academic literatures. This article approaches experienced safety in the public spaces of nightlife areas as emerging from encounters between human and non-human (material, social, cultural) elements grounded in time and space. Such elements include the characteristics of the built environment, the design of public space, police presence, lighting and also first and secondhand experiences and popular media discourses more generally. We hypothesized that encounters between such elements necessarily renders some ambiguity in experienced safety, in the sense that the effect of a particular element on experienced safety is always coproduced in the unfolding encounter. By drawing on a series of interviews with Dutch students in Utrecht, various types of ambiguity are shown to exist depending on both the particularities of the situation at hand and based on differences between individual circumstance and life course. Ambiguity is also shown to exist in the sense that mentioned elements may both comfort and alarm participants at the same time. Our findings infer that we should implement ‘safer nightlife’ initiatives that are tailored to particular contexts, situations and publics. The results also suggest that current interventions seeking to stimulate safety in urban nightlife settings might not be as successful in reducing/enhancing (un)safety as (popular) policy and media discourses have suggested.

Like many other European countries the Netherlands experienced a major influx of refugees in the fall of 2015. A majority of the population supported providing shelter to the refugees, but not without worries and anxieties about the effects of that influx, which sometimes lead to limited, local forms of social unrest. A study was started to shed more light on the worries and fears that existed in the population, on the assumptions these were based upon and on whether these worries and fears could lead to social unrest on a larger scale. The study was explorative, based on an eclectic, multi methods approach. The findings show that worries and anxieties were not limited to those who were opposed to the influx of migrants, but existed among supporters as well. The worries and anxieties were of a diverse nature, on topics like security, livability, economics, perceived (in)justice and socio-cultural aspects of life. A clear, credible answer or policy from the government was missed. When compared to the findings of earlier studies on the influx of migrants, some worries and anxieties seemed closely connected to what might be expected, in other cases a distinct ‘disconnect’ was found. These could be understood however when distorting mechanisms were taken into consideration that have been described in studies of more general security perceptions. As the worries and anxieties on the influx of refugees resonated other existing worries, anxieties and fears in society, a ‘cocktail of concerns’ was created that, given the right trigger, could have led to social unrest on a larger scale.

In this article the following question is answered. What is the modus operandi of human smugglers that smuggle Syrian migrants to the Netherlands in de period 2014-2016? Content analysis of police and Royal Marechaussee files, interviews with experts and Syrian migrants and literature research has revealed that: Syrian migrants in first instance use the South-Eastern route overseas from Turkey to Greece, for which they pay 1200-4000 euro to a smuggler, depending on the quality of the boat. From Greece some travel over land on the Balkan route. Several means of transportation are used on this route, with smugglers asking prices ranging from tens to hundreds of euros. Also they travel large parts on their own. Others are smuggled by airplane, for which they need (false) documentation. Smuggling by plane tends to be successful when departing from a small airfield, when made a detour through visa-free countries and/or a good quality (false) travel document. Prices range from 2.000 to 14.000 euros. Migrants mostly pay cash through irregular ‘banks’, a third party that plays an important facilitating role within several smuggling networks. These networks consist of several cells, with in these cells leaders and ‘employees’ and are located on migration routes and ‘hubs’ like Istanbul, Athens and Milan. The South-Eastern route is mostly in hands of Turkish criminal networks, and the continuation of the journey by airplane or through Milan over land is in hands of Syrian Dutch smugglers, the Balkan route seems to be mainly operated by individual smugglers. Within these smuggling networks the most important roles are: the recruiter, who is responsible for making contact with migrants on migration hubs or social media. The organizer/leader who coordinates activities along the smuggling route and calls employees to account. And finally the driver. Responsible for transporting the migrants and instructing them. Based on these findings several recommendations were made that can be found in this article or full research rapport.

The Mobile Security Monitor (MSM) is a form of migration policing in the border areas of the Netherlands, carried out by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (KMar). The MSM has a complex legal and policy framework, merging migration control aims with certain elements of crime control. This raises the question how the officers carrying out the MSM interpret the exact aim of the instrument and their own accompanying powers and what this means for the way they carry out their task. Our results show that many officers see ‘catching criminals’ an important part of their job and that in order to achieve this, they sometimes make ‘creative use’ of their wide-ranging powers. Although similar results have been found in research with the police, KMar officers differ because of their ability to combine migration law and criminal law powers. This fits in with the process of crimmigration and the broader tendency of ad-hoc instrumentalism, which refers to a way of thinking about law and legal procedures in which the formal distinction between legal domains is considered less important and criminal justice actors can freely choose the most effective instrument to deal with the situation at hand. This means that the formal ground for a decision is not always transparent, especially not for people that are subjected to the MSM. Moreover, criminal law enforcement contains many more legal and procedural safeguards than administrative controls.