The aim of the present research was to gain insight into the topic of ‘task-related rule-breaking behavior’ (TRB) among Dutch police officers. TRB is a more refined alternative for the concept of noble cause corruption and has been defined as: police officers breaking rules or formal agreements for the purpose of acting in a manner that contributes to the lawful police task. Qualitative research has been conducted within one of the ten regional police forces in the Netherlands. Results show that TRB appears to be a relatively common phenomenon during policework. Behaviors are categorized in sixteen categories and five overarching outlines. In addition, attention is given to several important factors that could be related to TRB being distinguishable between police officers’ individual responsibility and organizational factors. To handle TRB, it is recommended to pay attention to the police officers’ approach of judging and rationalizing their own behavior, their level of knowledge, and social skills. Furthermore, organizational structure (i.e., spam of control) and police leadership may, among other factors, play an important role in encouraging TRB. Especially the way supervisors deal with police officers’ professional autonomy needs specific attention in order to reduce TRB. Autonomy needs guidance in the form of clear orders followed by feedback and coaching. Also, an active form of ethical leadership is needed. An action framework is presented that could be helpful to supervisors to judge and thereby reduce forms of TRB.

Little is known about (former) partners of 1%motorcycle club members. Social professionals working with victims of domestic violence in shelters have regular encounters with these mostly female (ex-)partners. In this exploratory contribution we wonder what is known about domestic violence amongst people with (ex-)partners of 1%motorcycle club members and the consequences of the involvement of a motorcycle club for tackling this violence. Based on thirteen semi-structured interviews with social professionals working in a shelter, external professionals and (ex-)partners, the link between domestic violence and membership of a motorcycle club could not be verified. What this research does show is that safety is the number one priority in working with these (ex-)partners. Furthermore, it shows how complex it is to assess the seriousness of potential threat coming from these 1%motorcyle clubs. Further research on domestic violence in environments associated with organised crime and the cooperation between the judiciary system and social professionals is needed to improve safety and wellbeing for this specific group.

Traditionally, the mayor has an important role as a citizen’s father and as a maintainer of public order. In the context of the so-called ‘undermining’ criminality, the mayor has been increasingly empowered with new legal instruments to combat undermining criminality. Some mayors see themselves as a sheriff. However, in the Dutch Municipal Act, the mayor only has a task of maintaining the public order. How does this task relate to combating undermining criminality? What is the role of the mayor in the combat of undermining criminality? Nowadays, there is no legal basis in the Dutch Municipal Act to equip the mayor with crime-fighting duties. This article proposes to equip the mayor with a legal duty as a crime fighter.

Undermining has become a buzz-word in Dutch politics and security governance. On national and local level there is great concern about the disappearing lines between the legal and illegal world, which affects the democratic order and rule of law in the Netherlands. Hence, everything possible should be done in order to combat the creeping threat of undermining. However, what is undermining actually? And why has the concept become so popular now? In this contribution, the authors will consider those and other relevant key questions about the rise and effect of the undermining concept to provide more conceptual clarity. By critically reflecting on undermining as a speech act, that is ‘underminization’ (cf. securitization), and based on empirical research, the authors suggest that there are two discourses at work that hinder the effectivity of the concept: one is specifically focused on the drugs industry with its illegal activities and one broadens the concept into unlawful and undesired developments that interfere with societal stability. The authors conclude that the concept of undermining may mobilize at policy level, yet seems to paralyze at operational level.

This contribution reports on a delimited part of a larger, exploratory study, the main question of which was: How do aldermen perceive threats, what are their behavioral intentions and what is the influence of threats on the process and the outcome of decision-making? This question was answered with the help of Q methodology, semi structured interviews and case studies. This article discusses the results of the case studies and semi structured interviews on the impact of threats on decision-making. In two of the investigated cases (N=3) there are indications that the threats affect the decision-making process. The first case involves risk-avoiding behavior. In the second case there is a stronger conviction and hardening of opinions. There are no indications that threats affect the outcome of the decision-making process. The political administrative system that we have in the Netherlands is able to counteract improper influence. This is due to various elements in the system such as the boldness and the results-focused attitude of civil service (case 1) and the mayor and aldermen (case 2 and 3) and the design of the rules and procedures (case 1, 2 and 3).

This contribution reports about a research in a medium-sized municipality on the possibilities of giving municipalities an instrument to determine at the earliest possible stage which neighborhoods are at (increased) risk of exposure to organized crime and its consequences. We are searching for indicators to measure that exposure to give direction to preventive measures. Our focus is on the erosion of structures and foundations of society as a result of activities of organized crime, eventually resulting in the infringement of the rule of law. It is therefore not about the phenomenon of organized crime itself, but about its effects on society. This requires clarification and measurability of the concept. In this first exploration, we focus on the following five manifestations of the effect of organized crime: The emergence of a subculture: not recognizing government authority; the emergence of takeover of power in the neighborhood; the emergence of vulnerable groups of citizens; the creation of the image: crime pays off; and the emergence of unfair competition.

Loïc Wacquant conducted ethnographic research in the ghetto of Chicago and describes the route to social mobility that black boxers try to follow as they train in the gym and build body capital. Based on similar research methods, this article compares the black boxers to two episodes of kickboxing in Amsterdam. Wacquant is not hopeful when it comes to social mobility of the boxers, as he sees their boxing careers as confirmation of their low position in society. In the first Dutch episode, kickboxers manage to combine body work in the gym with working in the nightlife economy. They make money but are unaware of the danger of getting involved in criminal activities, and a number of fighters end up in prison or even dead. Currently, kickboxing is very popular with young Moroccans. Having seen what went wrong in the previous episode, Moroccan trainers keep a close watch on their pupils, and make sure they realize that what happens outside and after kickboxing is what really matters.

Several authors fear that the expansion of Dutch mayors’ executive powers in the field of safety and security will harm their position as non-partisan and consensus-oriented leaders. Empirical research into how mayors use their powers, however, is still rare. From a leadership perspective, the current article analyzes how mayors in the region of South East Brabant in Netherlands use their administrative power to close homes involved in drug-related crime. Drawing on Fischer’s framework of discursive practices, we analyze mayors’ considerations in terms of the argumentation they provide for closing homes. Our analysis, which draws on interviews and document analysis, covers 27 cases from the police region of South-East Brabant and includes 120 considerations. Our findings indicate that mayors vindicate home closures mostly through policy-derived technical and situational argumentations. Vindications that aspire a particular societal effect, such as the reduction of criminal activity, or ideological motivations are rarer, which is indicative of a non-decisive leadership style. In addition, mayors mostly respect the local closure policies. As such, they show very little decisive and individualistic leadership. And, to the extent that they deviate from agreed-upon regional policies, their motivation is to be able to take into account unique local circumstances. In the use of their administrative powers mayors, thus, show mostly situational and adaptive leadership, which, rather than as visionaries, positions them as caretakers. The leadership style of Dutch mayor in the use of this administrative power is, thus, much more in accordance with their traditional bridging-and-bonding leadership style than some authors suspect. Some of the limitations of our study are that we have analyzed closure decisions from one region only and that real-life decisions are susceptible to contextual influences. At the same time, our study provides a rare insight into real-world mayoral leadership in the Netherlands in the field of safety and security.

In the Netherlands, over the past 25 years mayors have had an increasing number of formal powers, based on administrative law, to fight against crime and disorder. Now, the Dutch mayors have the power to impose a restraining order, to close houses in case of drugs and/or drugs trade, or to decline a request for a permit when it might be used for illegal activities.
To implement these measures, the local government is highly dependent on (information provided by) the police. At this moment we do not have much information about this cooperation between local government and the police in the management of crime and disorder. This paper is based on an empirical study concerning this issue. It shows that the inter-organizational cooperation between local government and the police may differ strongly, however this cooperation still often depends on central factors and circumstances. An important factor is the (growing) distance between the police and local government in regard to the local approach of problems of crime and disorder. A significant number of local police officers concentrates mainly on the maintenance of law and order by criminal law enforcement instead of the implementation of administrative measures. As a result, local government is often unsatisfied about the contribution of the police. For example, the quality of the information provided by the police is often perceived as insufficient. In some cases local governments try to diminish the degree of interdependency with the police and to strengthen their own position in the local safety domain.

Since the 1970s social integration of the police has been considered as a key element of the Dutch police. This article focusses on the question of the relevance of social integration of the contemporary police. The article is based on interviews with present and former strategic leaders of the Dutch police. This study shows that social integration is still often considered to be a highly important value for the Dutch police, particularly with regard to the growing polarisation in society. However, some of the police chiefs also express their disapproval of the concept of social integration; in their view the concept reminds us of the past. Also, police chiefs are critical of the value of the concept because of its supposed geographical focus. The paper shows that this criticism can be understood as an interpretation of social integration in terms of ‘neighbourhood policing’ and as an operational police strategy.

The most important mechanism for crime prevention is just the presence of guardians. Some counter arguments against this thesis are discussed and rejected. By manipulating the presence of guardians it is possible to influence the level of prevention. It is argued that a large scale evaluation of such measures is wanted.

In this article the following question is answered. What is the modus operandi of human smugglers that smuggle Syrian migrants to the Netherlands in de period 2014-2016? Content analysis of police and Royal Marechaussee files, interviews with experts and Syrian migrants and literature research has revealed that: Syrian migrants in first instance use the South-Eastern route overseas from Turkey to Greece, for which they pay 1200-4000 euro to a smuggler, depending on the quality of the boat. From Greece some travel over land on the Balkan route. Several means of transportation are used on this route, with smugglers asking prices ranging from tens to hundreds of euros. Also they travel large parts on their own. Others are smuggled by airplane, for which they need (false) documentation. Smuggling by plane tends to be successful when departing from a small airfield, when made a detour through visa-free countries and/or a good quality (false) travel document. Prices range from 2.000 to 14.000 euros. Migrants mostly pay cash through irregular ‘banks’, a third party that plays an important facilitating role within several smuggling networks. These networks consist of several cells, with in these cells leaders and ‘employees’ and are located on migration routes and ‘hubs’ like Istanbul, Athens and Milan. The South-Eastern route is mostly in hands of Turkish criminal networks, and the continuation of the journey by airplane or through Milan over land is in hands of Syrian Dutch smugglers, the Balkan route seems to be mainly operated by individual smugglers. Within these smuggling networks the most important roles are: the recruiter, who is responsible for making contact with migrants on migration hubs or social media. The organizer/leader who coordinates activities along the smuggling route and calls employees to account. And finally the driver. Responsible for transporting the migrants and instructing them. Based on these findings several recommendations were made that can be found in this article or full research rapport.

In the traditional understanding of police culture as well as in the criticism against the use of the concept of ‘police culture’, not much attention has been paid towards the influence of the representation of police work and crime in the media. Although since the pioneering studies in the sixties and seventies of the last century it has been made clear that police work is not limited to dealing with crime and criminal justice, the mass media for decades have presented a completely different image: one of thrill seeking and hardcore action. Police officers themselves tend to ‘sensationalize’ their work. Police culture is no longer understood as a deterministic coping mechanism, but is rooted in active and constructive participation of police officers. As a consequence we must pay attention to representation of ‘the police’ by the media and ask ourselves how identity work by police officers is influenced by the representation of crime and the police in the (new) media.

Since winter 2014, Belgian is faced with a possible rolling out of power. Blackouts come without any warning whilst the duration and cause of it is mostly unclear. Rolling outs are usually planned by utility companies to put small service areas without electricity, to cope with a high energy demand that the utility companies can’t supply. This rolling out plan can prevent a larger blackout and should make people aware of the consequences of a possible black-out.
Given this situation, this paper presents the result of a study asking citizens about their self-efficacy and organizations of their own house hold to deal with possible blackouts. For this survey, 473 citizens have been interviewed in 2 Belgian cities. We asked about their own action to organize themselves and were looking at their expectations of the government.