Traditionally, the mayor has an important role as a citizen’s father and as a maintainer of public order. In the context of the so-called ‘undermining’ criminality, the mayor has been increasingly empowered with new legal instruments to combat undermining criminality. Some mayors see themselves as a sheriff. However, in the Dutch Municipal Act, the mayor only has a task of maintaining the public order. How does this task relate to combating undermining criminality? What is the role of the mayor in the combat of undermining criminality? Nowadays, there is no legal basis in the Dutch Municipal Act to equip the mayor with crime-fighting duties. This article proposes to equip the mayor with a legal duty as a crime fighter.

The promises of Big Data, predictive policing and artificial intelligence hold a key position in the public debate for quite some time now. Optimists tell that it is possible to predict where criminal events will occur before they take place. This would implicate a major shift towards a crime and insecurity preventive society, feeding on our cultural longing for a secure future. Therefore we give algorithms and deep learning access to more and more aspects of our lives. But how realistic and desirable is the application of Big Data techniques in the area of security?
In this article we put focus on the research question ‘In which way can Big Data and predictive policing support good governance of security?’, that has led our study. By exploring the central concepts, the processes behind them and their results in the domain of public security, we conclude that there are only rather disappointing results from the application of these techniques: crime and insecurity have not dropped when the police and other organizations turned to Big Data techniques. Instead, many negative side effects occurred. We search for explanations in six central academic critiques on the application of these techniques in the area of security.
We have found several ways to guaranty principles of good governance in the application of Big Data techniques, but these require a firm paradigm shift on Big Data in general. The heuristics of security professionals should not be overshadowed by technological promises: the professional should always be in the loop, must understand the way predictions come into existence and must be able to correct flaws and bugs of (semi-)automated decisions. We conclude that safeguarding public security must remain human work in which Big Data techniques can assist.

Analysing large amounts of data goes to the heart of the challenges confronting intelligence and law enforcement professionals today. Increasingly, this involves Internet data that are ‘open source’ or ‘publicly available’. Projects such as the European FP7 VIRTUOSO aim at developing platforms for open-source intelligence by law enforcement and public security, which open up opportunities for large-scale, automated data gathering and analysis. However, the mere fact that data are publicly available does not imply an absence of restrictions to researching them. This paper investigates one area of legal constraints, namely Dutch criminal-procedure law in relation to open-source data gathering by the police. Which legal basis is there for this activity? And under what conditions can foreign open sources be investigated?
After sketching the context of the VIRTUOSO project and legal constraints of open-source intelligence in general, this paper discusses provisions of the Dutch Police Act 1993 and the Code of Criminal Procedure to determine which is the correct legal basis for gathering data from openly accessible and semi-open sources. Next, cross-border gathering of data is discussed on the basis of article 32 of the Cybercrime Convention. The paper draws the conclusion that investigating open sources by the police will often go beyond what is allowed on the basis of the general task description of the police (art. 2 Police Act 1993); hence, an order from the Public Prosecutor for systematic observation or intelligence is required. Moreover, the tools used must meet the non-manipulability and auditing requirements of the Dutch Decree on Technical Devices in Criminal Procedure.

Public Private Partnerships (PPS) are becoming one of the most popular answers to problems of crime and disorder. In this contribution, the authors research the Collective Shop Ban, maybe the most successful form of Public Private Partnerships currently operating in the Netherlands. A Collective Shop Ban is a civil measure bestowed upon a person by the shop owner, when s/he displays ‘unwanted behaviour’. As a consequence entry can be denied for every shop assembled in the association of entrepreneurs. In 2007 almost 900 people have been denied access to over 450 shops in the city centre of The Hague. This new form of collaboration between police, public prosecution service and entrepreneurs has already been rewarded with the Regional Crime Control Platform ‘safety award’. However, the authors question the effects of this collaboration. They argue that the Collective Shop Ban creates its own public of ‘unwanted shoppers’, that can be banned from a shopping area by devising new terms of exclusion. This ‘public’ is subjected to new means of power, to be applied by private security guards and shop owners. While entrepreneurs celebrate the possibilities of this civil measure, the authors warn for the juridical and ethical consequences of this measure.

Public Private Partnerships (PPS) are becoming one of the most popular answers to problems of crime and disorder. In this contribution, the authors research the Collective Shop Ban, maybe the most successful form of Public Private Partnerships currently operating in the Netherlands. A Collective Shop Ban is a civil measure bestowed upon a person by the shop owner, when s/he displays ‘unwanted behaviour’. As a consequence entry can be denied for every shop assembled in the association of entrepreneurs. In 2007 almost 900 people have been denied access to over 450 shops in the city centre of The Hague. This new form of collaboration between police, public prosecution service and entrepreneurs has already been rewarded with the Regional Crime Control Platform ‘safety award’. However, the authors question the effects of this collaboration. They argue that the Collective Shop Ban creates its own public of ‘unwanted shoppers’, that can be banned from a shopping area by devising new terms of exclusion. This ‘public’ is subjected to new means of power, to be applied by private security guards and shop owners. While entrepreneurs celebrate the possibilities of this civil measure, the authors warn for the juridical and ethical consequences of this measure.