Both major disasters and smaller incidents at chemical companies impact the environment. Seveso regulations aim to limit the impact of the chemical industry on man and the environment. This leads to the expectation that violation of these rules is predictive of incidents. In the current study, incidents at chemical companies are predicted from the company’s history of rule violation, previously reported incidents and corporate characteristics. Analysis of three years of inspection data and of six years of reported incidents, shows that the company’s branch and previous reported incidents predict the occurrence of an incident. The company’s history of rule violation, however, does not. Future research is needed to examine the different possible explanations for these contra intuitive results.

Within the group of Dutch foundlings, 28% are migratory foundlings: children coming from abroad to the Netherlands (inbound foundlings), and children going abroad from the Netherlands (outbound foundlings). According to the rational choice theory, there is at some point a rational decision behind human action, based on consideration of costs and benefits – terminology reminiscent of the origins within economic science. When viewed from that perspective, cross-border abandonment may be regarded to be a conscious effort to hinder detection. After all, abandonment of foundlings has been a criminal offence in the Netherlands since at least the Middle Ages. There is therefore also a vested interest in not attracting attention. Anyone abandoning a child and wishing to protect their identity will be attracted to locations that lack effective supervision, defined as guardianship within the criminological routine activities theory. However, the less familiar a location, the trickier it is to avoid visibility. Does the rational consideration of costs and benefits result in migratory foundlings being abandoned just over the border (in order that the perpetrators attract the least possible attention) or actually further inland (in order to detract from the cross-border activity, for example)? Is there a comparable choice in terms of distance when people abandon native foundlings – children found in their country of birth? Relevant questions indeed, as greater insight into such variables can support the direction taken by detection activities. This study is an exploratory analysis of the distance between the domicile or birth location and the abandonment location of cross-border foundlings. The results will then be compared with the distances in the case of domestic foundlings.

Between 2013-2017 there were many ISIS videos circulating. It was generally assumed that these videos would encourage young Muslims to radicalize and join ISIS. But what do we actually know about the imaginary world of young people? Do sociological aspects such as the economic, cultural and religious background play a decisive role in this? Can we use the films and TV series that young people see as an entry into their imaginary world? To what extent can image analysis provide knowledge that contributes to safety issues? Commissioned by the Department of Counterterrorism, Radicalization and Extremism (CTER) of the Dutch National Police, the IVMV Foundation invited, in a comparative pilot study, twenty Dutch youngsters (10 with a Muslim background and 10 police students) to share their viewing experiences with five trailers (3 Hollywood, 1 Netflix, 1 not explicit violent ISIS video) that touched on the ISIS issue. This resulted in a research report and a film (in Dutch as well as in English) that was presented in November 2017 (De Mare et al. 2017a; De Mare 2017b). A remarkable result was that their viewing experiences and feelings showed a lot of similarity.

Until recently, Dutch merchant ships could not rely on privately contracted maritime security staff to protect themselves against pirates. On the one hand, the argument prevailed that the State had to retain the monopoly on the use of force and, on the other hand, one also feared for the escalation of violence or international incidents. Nowadays, however, more and more European countries allow for the use of privately contracted armed security personnel on board merchant ships. As a result, the Dutch Parliament has adopted a bill containing rules for the use of armed private security guards on board Dutch maritime merchant ships (Law to Protect Merchant Shipping 2019 (published in the Dutch official Gazette on June 7th, 2019)).
The author addresses the question whether because of the new law a level playing field will emerge with the Merchant Navies from the neighboring Flag States of Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain and Denmark, presenting a comparative analysis of their domestic legislation.
The Dutch law clearly regulates the use of force and the master has the final responsibility for everything that happens under his authority. In principle, the security guards may only apply violence as the master has determined that it is necessary. Innovative is that there is a reporting obligation whereby every incident should be reported with images and sound recordings. It seems, however, that the law is especially made to protect and secure and not necessarily to provide a solution for situations in which pirates come on board.
It is clear that the intention of the legislator is to leave the monopoly on the use of force in the hands of the State. However, the adoption of this law to protect merchant shipping could constitute a first step in enabling the use of force by other actors than the State, which in itself is groundbreaking. Before being able to go on this road, there are still countless political (mainly related to the sovereignty of a State) and legal challenges (mainly concerning the use of force and respect for human rights) to be addressed.

Several authors fear that the expansion of Dutch mayors’ executive powers in the field of safety and security will harm their position as non-partisan and consensus-oriented leaders. Empirical research into how mayors use their powers, however, is still rare. From a leadership perspective, the current article analyzes how mayors in the region of South East Brabant in Netherlands use their administrative power to close homes involved in drug-related crime. Drawing on Fischer’s framework of discursive practices, we analyze mayors’ considerations in terms of the argumentation they provide for closing homes. Our analysis, which draws on interviews and document analysis, covers 27 cases from the police region of South-East Brabant and includes 120 considerations. Our findings indicate that mayors vindicate home closures mostly through policy-derived technical and situational argumentations. Vindications that aspire a particular societal effect, such as the reduction of criminal activity, or ideological motivations are rarer, which is indicative of a non-decisive leadership style. In addition, mayors mostly respect the local closure policies. As such, they show very little decisive and individualistic leadership. And, to the extent that they deviate from agreed-upon regional policies, their motivation is to be able to take into account unique local circumstances. In the use of their administrative powers mayors, thus, show mostly situational and adaptive leadership, which, rather than as visionaries, positions them as caretakers. The leadership style of Dutch mayor in the use of this administrative power is, thus, much more in accordance with their traditional bridging-and-bonding leadership style than some authors suspect. Some of the limitations of our study are that we have analyzed closure decisions from one region only and that real-life decisions are susceptible to contextual influences. At the same time, our study provides a rare insight into real-world mayoral leadership in the Netherlands in the field of safety and security.

In the Netherlands, over the past 25 years mayors have had an increasing number of formal powers, based on administrative law, to fight against crime and disorder. Now, the Dutch mayors have the power to impose a restraining order, to close houses in case of drugs and/or drugs trade, or to decline a request for a permit when it might be used for illegal activities.
To implement these measures, the local government is highly dependent on (information provided by) the police. At this moment we do not have much information about this cooperation between local government and the police in the management of crime and disorder. This paper is based on an empirical study concerning this issue. It shows that the inter-organizational cooperation between local government and the police may differ strongly, however this cooperation still often depends on central factors and circumstances. An important factor is the (growing) distance between the police and local government in regard to the local approach of problems of crime and disorder. A significant number of local police officers concentrates mainly on the maintenance of law and order by criminal law enforcement instead of the implementation of administrative measures. As a result, local government is often unsatisfied about the contribution of the police. For example, the quality of the information provided by the police is often perceived as insufficient. In some cases local governments try to diminish the degree of interdependency with the police and to strengthen their own position in the local safety domain.

The operational leader, the ‘gold commander’, fulfils a crucial function in crisis- and disaster management in the Netherlands. He is held responsible for the total coordination of all collaborating emergency services and supports/advises the Mayor, the Commander in Chief. Unfortunately, this function has never been very effective in practise, as shown by many evaluations. From a scientific point of view, it is easy to understand why the operational leader cannot be effective in the Dutch crisis management organisation. The operational leader has no authorities and has been seated in an emergency operation centre far from the Mayor. This article examines why this issue has not been solved, despite 30 years of studying and adjusting the Dutch crisis management organisation.

The Dutch Regional Fire Services collectively aim at preventing fire, casualties and damage. The main activity is informing citizens about fire risks and the appropriate measures they can take. From both a political and social perspective, it is valuable to know what the return of the Community Fire Safety program is. One way to chart the return of the program is a comparison of the cost of, and society’s willingness-to-pay for, the program. To estimate this willingness-to-pay, this article applies the contingent valuation method to a national representative sample of 806 Dutch citizens. The results show that willingness-to-pay of an average Dutch household is estimated to be between € 25.00 and € 35.67 per year provided the Community Fire Safety program improves the fire safety by 10%. At the national level, this amounts to 200 – 270 million euro annually. This value is seven to ten times more than the approximate costs of the current Community Fire Safety program.

Since the 1970s social integration of the police has been considered as a key element of the Dutch police. This article focusses on the question of the relevance of social integration of the contemporary police. The article is based on interviews with present and former strategic leaders of the Dutch police. This study shows that social integration is still often considered to be a highly important value for the Dutch police, particularly with regard to the growing polarisation in society. However, some of the police chiefs also express their disapproval of the concept of social integration; in their view the concept reminds us of the past. Also, police chiefs are critical of the value of the concept because of its supposed geographical focus. The paper shows that this criticism can be understood as an interpretation of social integration in terms of ‘neighbourhood policing’ and as an operational police strategy.

Following a crisis, questions are often raised about how this crisis could have happened and whether someone is to be blamed for the crisis or its bad management. The blame game can become fierce as actors try to avoid, shift or mitigate blame in order to stay in office. In 2014, a festival took place in Haaksbergen where a monster truck drove into the audience, killing three people and injuring many others. Not enough safety measures had been taken to prevent the tragedy. Many actors were to blame for that, including the local authority which had granted the permit. Other actors blamed for the events were the mayor, the monster truck driver, and the organization organizing the festival. In the end, the mayor of Haaksbergen resigned. Instead of becoming more accommodative in his response as his blame levels increased, the mayor continued to be quite defensive, stating that the permit would be granted again – even with today’s knowledge. As one council member stated it, one cannot defend something which cannot be defended.

This contribution reports on a delimited part of a larger, exploratory study, the main question of which was: How do aldermen perceive threats, what are their behavioral intentions and what is the influence of threats on the process and the outcome of decision-making? This question was answered with the help of Q-methodology, semi-structured interviews and case studies. This article discusses the results of the Q-methodology and the semi-structured interviews. The case studies will be reported separately later on. Through the Q-methodology three patterns in perception were found in dealing with threats: ‘combative and decisive’, ‘vulnerable and thoughtful’ and ‘down-to-earth and accepting’. The interviews show that it usually concerns instrumental threats that are deliberately used to influence decision making, which usually take place in the private sphere and vary from verbal aggression to physical violence. Most threats come from individuals, but some come from groups, in some cases there is a relationship with criminals. In the cases reviewed, the consequences in the private sphere are far-reaching, there are indications for the influence on public functioning (from hardening to great caution). There is almost always a report, a fuss in the media can affect the authority of the official.

This study focusses on determinants of willingness to report cybercrime to the police or to other organizations and motivations for (not) reporting victimization. In this study, a questionnaire containing vignettes is used. Vignettes are semi-experimental designs in which hypothetical situations are presented and certain factors can be manipulated between and within respondents. Factors that are measured within the vignettes are the type and seriousness of the offence, the relationship between offender and victim and which possibilities for reporting the offence are available.
It is shown that the type of offence is an important determinant for willingness to report the offence, which is highest for fraud, followed by hacking and malware. Likewise, willingness to report is higher for more serious offences than for less serious offences. These results are comparable to results on willingness to report traditional crimes.
With regard to psychological determinants, results are not in line with previous results on willingness to report traditional crimes. For the relationship between offender and victim, mixed results are found. If the offender is an acquaintance of the victim, willingness to report to the police increases, but willingness to report to another organization decreases, compared to the offender being unfamiliar to the victim. Another surprising result is that no correlation is found between attitudes towards the police and willingness to report offences. Also unexpectedly, it is found that respondents who have previously reported crime and were unsatisfied about this experience, were more willing to report offences than respondents who never reported crimes before.
Regarding motivations for willingness to report, it is found that, in general, motivations for reporting cybercrime are strongly comparable to motivations for reporting traditional crime, however, differences in motivations are found between the different types of cybercrime.

In the context of criminal investigations police and prosecution can appeal to the public for information to further their case. This decision cannot be taken lightly and requires a balancing exercise between the rights of the suspect (and other people involved), specifically the right to privacy, the interest of criminal investigations, such as the identification of the suspect or witnesses, and public pressure to fight crime.
In the current digital society, the prosecutor can choose between a wide range of (new) media and modes of communication to ask for information. Next to wanted notices on paper posters and broadcasts on television, appeals for information are published on websites, social media platforms, apps and digital screens. Citizens can modify and share these appeals and they can comment on them. This necessitates careful consideration by the prosecutor on whether and how to appeal for information. After all, these appeals could lead to DIY-policing or online vigilantism (digilantism), leading to infringements on the right to privacy and even possibly to misidentification of suspects.
This article contributes to the continuing debate. We describe the legal framework the prosecution has to take into account in such cases. The importance of a considered decision is illustrated by three cases in which judicial authorities appealed to the public for help in the criminal investigations, resulting in massive (media) attention and consequently affecting the eventual criminal case against the defendants. In two of these cases the prosecutorial decision to involve the public’s help resulted in a violation of the defendants’ rights to privacy and consequently had to be remedied by the court. Both cases led to social, legal and political debate about the balance between privacy and crime control.

The Dutch Police Act provides the police with the legal power to gather information about a person on the internet as long as this does not cause more than ‘a limited violation of privacy’. If the police are gathering more information about a person they need a special legal power laid down in the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure. The dividing line between ‘a limited violation of privacy’ and ‘more than a limited violation of privacy’ is not always clear. The legislator is preparing a new piece of legislation to provide the police with more clarity. This article discusses the suggested law article with respect to the gathering of information from open sources. Furthermore, this article suggests to not only regulate the amount of information the police are gathering but also the kind of tools that the police use (simple search machine versus an advanced web crawler).

The most important mechanism for crime prevention is just the presence of guardians. Some counter arguments against this thesis are discussed and rejected. By manipulating the presence of guardians it is possible to influence the level of prevention. It is argued that a large scale evaluation of such measures is wanted.

The most important mechanism for crime prevention is just the presence of guardians. Some counter arguments against this thesis are discussed and rejected. By manipulating the presence of guardians it is possible to influence the level of prevention. It is argued that a large scale evaluation of such measures is wanted.

The ‘fear of crime’ is a buzzword among citizens, media, politicians and professionals by now. But the phenomenon seems to be as intangible as it is important. The struggle of professionals with this concept is the result of a too wide and self-evident problem definition. This article contains an alternative approach. The focus is on disturbed fear of crime: a negatively changed and problematically experienced fear of crime on the level of the neighborhood.
Through a review of the literature and previous research, we work towards this concept and apply it to the neighborhood of Kerckebosch in the municipality of Zeist in the Netherlands. As during 2014 the local quantitative indicators for ‘the fear of crime’ rose from 7% of the local population indicating to ‘sometimes feel unsafe’ to 22%, while the rest of the municipality remained quite stable. Additionally, several local professionals received complaints of multiple local inhabitants claiming to ‘feel unsafe’ in the neighborhood. Our research question was: What explanations for their ‘disturbed fear of crime’ do local inhabitants of the neighborhood Kerckebosch give?
It was highly plausible that this local rise of the fear in Kerckebosch was connected to the social re-engineering of the neighborhood, but the exact nature of the quantitative rise was unclear. Therefore, we have interviewed 25 local inhabitants. Qualitative analyses showed the local rise of ‘the fear of crime’ to be the result of: (I) physical characteristics of the neighborhood; (II) events of burglary and intimidation from the past; (III) the presence of loitering youths and – primarily – (VI) a backlash of social integration as a side effect of the social re-engineering of the neighborhood. These qualitative explanations to the observed quantitative discontinuity led to several policy advises, which were based on international effect studies.

The rationale behind refugee law is that people who fear persecution in their home country can seek and find a safe haven in another country. The situation in Eritrea with its national service and wide-spread human rights violations is reason why many Eritreans flee their country. A vast number of them want to apply for asylum in European countries. After a risky journey over the African continent where they face risks of kidnappings, trafficking for ransom, and situations of inhuman and degrading treatment, they reach Europe. Some of them continue their journey to the Netherlands. The central question in this article is whether or not their safety and well-being are at stake once they arrive in the Netherlands. Situations of involvement of and intimidation by the Eritrean regime in the Netherlands, diaspora tax that is forcibly collected, involvement of the Orthodox Church and indications of human trafficking have been reported in media and reports, by individuals and organisations. In this article the outcomes of a research on the concerns about the well-being of Eritrean asylum seekers in reception centres among employers of organisations responsible for their safety and well-being are presented and discussed. Data were collected and discussed during four focus group meetings with a total of 33 professionals. The concerns are divided in three groups: 1) Concerns about the capacities and possibilities to integrate in Dutch society, 2) Concerns about religion and rituals, and 3) Concerns about indications of human trafficking. These concerns are further elaborated based on which the conclusion is drawn that more tailored support and assistance is required for successful integration of Eritreans in Dutch society, their empowerment and resilience against threats and challenges in Dutch society.