The judgment ‘NGK/Gort’ from the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (04-10-2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:1531) gives an important explanation about the church-state relation in general and the ecclestiacal service law-position concerning the pastor in particular. The legal starting point is not in civil law, but in church law. This is the consequence of the right of selfregulation (autonomy) of the church and the non-interference from the state, as recognized by article 2:2 Dutch Civil Code and article 9 jo. 11 ECHR. This principle stands against normal civil mandatory law, for example labor law. It will only be overruled in exceptional cases by civil law of fundamental nature. Than a judicial consideration is necessary taking into account the fundamental rights of the church and the opposant.

Confessional secrecy is inviolable under Catholic canon law, and violations of it are severely sanctioned. Some people see this secret as an obstacle to the legal process in society and advocate a limitation in its use. This article argues that this form of confidentiality also can be defended in civil law because of the protection of spiritual care. Confessional secrecy is analyzed here and compared with forms of official secrecy that are recognized in society. Finally, there is a plea for a clear legal framework for the application of this confessional secret by Catholic priests.

The election defeat of the Christian coalition in 1905 is partly caused by contradictions in its own circle. Many orthodox members of the Dutch Reformed Church resented Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper for having legally regulated the position of the Free University at Amsterdam, but had done nothing for the rights of the Dutch Reformed Church in the theological faculties at the universities of the state. The reformed theologian Hoedemaker even aroused a preference for a liberal rather than an anti-revolutionary candidate. Kuyper’s party lost nine seats, the coalition lost three seats to the majority.

The worldwide ‘lockdown’ due to Covid-19 has had an accelerating effect on the ongoing discussion of Islamic burial in the Netherlands. Because of the closure of airspace Moroccan and Turkish-Dutch deceased could no longer be repatriated to be buried in their country of origin. This increased the pressure on cemeteries in the Netherlands to provide for the requirements and rituals of an Islamic burial. And this in turn showed the importance of the discussion that is already taking place in the House of Representatives about changes to the laws and regulations concerning burials. These three dimensions of Islamic burial in the Netherlands – personal, practical and legal – are discussed in this article.

This article delineates the problem of judicial subjectivity in so-called ‘hard cases’. Decisions in such cases are essentially decisions of conscience, which in principle can escape the control mechanisms of objectivation and justification. This leads to the question as to the attributes of a good judge.

When does an appeal to the heritage of Christianity intensify our ethical sensitivity? When does an appeal to the Christian heritage diminish our ethical sensitivity? How to distinguish authentic Christianity from its cultural shape? All these questions highlight an ethical theme intimately interwoven with the many references to Christianity in contemporary politics. In that perspective, even a neologism was coined, the ‘Gutmensch’. When neologisms pop up and daily appear in newspapers, alertness is indispensable and an accurate approach is required.

The proposed Act on Citizenship Education requires fundamental reflection from several angles. The article provides a perspective from remarks describing the current age and a possible list of values for a democratic state. Important is also the perspective from educational freedom, on which topic several publications from the Onderwijsraad were issued in December 2019. The proposed Act (with the different versions of its explanation by the Minister) are critically evaluated and confronted with an alternative proposal.

This is the second part of the revised translation of ‘Understanding sharia in the West’ that was published in the Journal of Law, Religion and State 2018, 6, p. 236-273. The first part of the translation appeared in Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 2019, 3, p. 17-31.

Do religious motives result in greater freedom of action? This question cannot be answered with a simple yes or no. First of all, a distinction must be made between conduct that falls within the scope of the right to freedom of religion as opposed to other conduct. This distinction in turn needs some qualification. The aforementioned right can, after all, be restricted. The conduct in question could moreover fall within the purview of another fundamental right, as a result of which persons without religious motives are entitled to invoke another fundamental right. All these distinctions will be reviewed in this article. Special attention will be given to religiously motivated statements condemning homosexuality and the religiously motivated refusal to have children vaccinated.

Restrictions imposed by the state on the exercise of religion are always the result of a weighing of interests by a judge, an administrative body or a legislator. This weighing of interests is strongly influenced by the context within the exercise of religion take place. In this article four different spheres are distinguished: the internal religious sphere, the public sphere, the sphere of private institutions and the government sphere. The particular relationship that these spheres have with neutrality characterizes the balancing of interests. This explains and justifies why wearing religious clothing may be restricted in some situations and not in others.

The notion of ‘sharia in the West’ is by now fairly well established, both in social, political and scientific circles, but both the terms ‘sharia’ and ‘West’ remain difficult to define. It is therefore striking that the combination of these two terms is used with such self-evidence. This article wants to answer the question: what exactly is the sharia that Western Muslims arguably want, and how is this sharia received in the West? To this end, a model is presented that provides a description of the complex interaction between sharia as practiced by Western Muslims on the one hand, and the conditions that the Western environment sets for it on the other. The model shows that ‘sharia’ cannot be compared to a law system, and that the Western environment has a major influence on the extent and ways in which Muslims apply sharia. From a Western perspective, the model shows that sharia issues are mainly discussed in legal terms, while most controversies are not of a legal nature, but rather a cultural one.

In the ruling on Lachiri/Belgium, commentators discern a new development in the ECHR’s jurisprudence on the relationship between the headscarf and freedom of religion. According to the author, that is not the case: in fact, he observes a continued bias of the Court towards the headscarf.

Belgian Law mentions professional secrecy at different places. In recent years, professional secrecy has been nuanced or even eroded. It remains, however, an important item for certain professional groups, for some perhaps a privilege, for others a burden. Enough indications exist that ministers of the Protestant-Evangelical religion (pastors), even though they are not bound by priest-penitent privilege, are bound by professional secrecy. This makes it necessary to have a clear definition of ‘pastors’. Due to the relative ignorance about Protestantism in Belgium, this has taken some time. The article ends with the discussion of some practical aspects of the professional secrecy of pastors.

The Dutch social-liberal party D66 was founded in 1966, in the aftermath of the pillarisation (on religious grounds) of Dutch society. The founders of D66 wanted to ‘blow up’ the pillarised political system. They strongly took distance from religions that were in their views oppressing. A certain anti-religion attitude was a part of the DNA of the party. For decades it was ‘bon ton’ to criticise religion. A turning point has recently been observed by the writer. There is still a discomfort in relation to religion, but this discomfort is more related to not-knowing than being against. The writer pleads for going beyond the discomfort. Religion – in the broad sense of the word – has a lot to offer to society. We indeed can’t live without binding stories, places that are loaded with meaning and festivities that reminds ourselves of who we are and who we would want to be. Finally the modernity and religion can strengthen each other: where modernity is skilled in criticising religion, the Christian religion can make a contribution by criticising modernity.

The decision of the Court that Muslims from the Greek province of West Thrace can choose in matters of family law between civil or Islamic law, is not surprising. However, much can be said about the way in which the Court came to that conclusion. Because in doing so it uses principles and considerations that show a lack of insight in the status and functioning of a unique legal system, namely that of interpersonal law, or the coexistence on equal basis of several family laws. Similarly, the Court seems biased towards Islamic family law, which it consistently refers to as ‘sharia’. A critical discussion of this judgment is therefore appropriate.

Invoking the fundamental social right to assistance does not prevent the CRvB from also applying the traditional fundamental right to freedom of religion. This approach is in line with the current case-law of the ECHR. This also applies to the more subjective explanation of religion used by the CRvB. This can be justified by the doctrine of interpretative restraint and the importance of self-definition. In the light of these principles, it is unclear why the CRvB makes a distinction in the level of protection of different religious expressions when weighing up interests in the context of article 9 ECHR