The judgment ‘NGK/Gort’ from the Supreme Court of the Netherlands (04-10-2019, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:1531) gives an important explanation about the church-state relation in general and the ecclestiacal service law-position concerning the pastor in particular. The legal starting point is not in civil law, but in church law. This is the consequence of the right of selfregulation (autonomy) of the church and the non-interference from the state, as recognized by article 2:2 Dutch Civil Code and article 9 jo. 11 ECHR. This principle stands against normal civil mandatory law, for example labor law. It will only be overruled in exceptional cases by civil law of fundamental nature. Than a judicial consideration is necessary taking into account the fundamental rights of the church and the opposant.

Restrictions imposed by the state on the exercise of religion are always the result of a weighing of interests by a judge, an administrative body or a legislator. This weighing of interests is strongly influenced by the context within the exercise of religion take place. In this article four different spheres are distinguished: the internal religious sphere, the public sphere, the sphere of private institutions and the government sphere. The particular relationship that these spheres have with neutrality characterizes the balancing of interests. This explains and justifies why wearing religious clothing may be restricted in some situations and not in others.

Invoking the fundamental social right to assistance does not prevent the CRvB from also applying the traditional fundamental right to freedom of religion. This approach is in line with the current case-law of the ECHR. This also applies to the more subjective explanation of religion used by the CRvB. This can be justified by the doctrine of interpretative restraint and the importance of self-definition. In the light of these principles, it is unclear why the CRvB makes a distinction in the level of protection of different religious expressions when weighing up interests in the context of article 9 ECHR

On 20 December 2017, the Court of Justice of the EU ruled that an extrajudicial unilateral divorce brought about in Syria does not come within the substantive scope of the European regulation on the law applicable to divorces (Rome III Regulation). In response to this decision, the inequality between men and women in the divorce law of Muslim countries, the developments that are going on in this area, as well as the role the non-discrimination-principle plays in the recognition policies in European states on Islamic repudiations, are discussed in this contribution.

This article investigates the role of ‘implicit religion’ in extremism, including those forms that do not explicitly call upon formal religion. Extremist quasi-religious narratives expose an exclusionary logic, which is mirrored by radical ways of thinking about counter-extremism. This unfailingly leads to more polarization. Extremism can only be countered by radical openness. Resilient democracy requires that citizens, politicians and professionals are willing and able to maintain open hearts and minds. Implicit religion can support this. Spiritual counselors and scientists of religion need to support the creation of spiritual narratives and rituals that strengthen democratic resilience.

Some religious persons refuse to undergo certain medical treatments such as vaccinations or blood transfusions. They refuse treatment not only for themselves but for their children as well. Many fundamental rights may be at stake here: freedom of religion, the right to physical integrity and respect for family life on the one hand, and the duty of public authorities to provide for health care and defend children’s rights on the other. The main topic of this contribution is the extent to which the government is allowed to make certain treatments compulsory.

Two new rulings by the European Court of Human Rights confirm earlier jurisprudence regarding the ‘burqa ban’, as such ban is justified on the basis of the principle of ‘living together’. Still, two points stand out in these rulings that need discussion. The first is that this is an example of how the Court applies its new ‘qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach’ that pays more consideration to domestic decision-making in the field of human rights. These rulings show the flipside of this laudable endeavour, however, as the Court sees no reason to evaluate, let alone critically assess, the outcome of these domestic decision-making processes. Second, the remarkable ‘concurring opinion’ by the president of the ruling judges, in which he states in very stern wordings that the ruling should not be considered a cart blanche for burqa bans elsewhere. Given the elaborate considerations why such ban would not be admissible, it is surprising that the Court has failed to elaborate why the burqa bans in France and Belgium are admissible.

The Dutch freedom to set up schools has become illusory. The foundation standards (the number of students) are high and the current interpretation of the concept of direction (religion or philosophy of life) does not seem to be sufficiently connected with today’s pluriform society. The alternative of direction-free planning of schools had practical and fundamental objections. Parent statements are insufficiently reliable and a school without direction does not have a foundation. An extension of direction is neither without disadvantages: the government will have to test whether there is a sufficiently coherent concept to be able to count as a direction.

In a unanimous decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has accepted the refusal of an exemption of compulsory mixed swimming lessons for elementary school girls in Switzerland. The exemption was requested by the parents of the two girls as the requirement to let their daughters participate in those lessons was contrary to their religious conviction. The author discusses the decision in the light of national debates on integration and subscribes its outcome. Specific attention is paid to the ECtHR’s interpretation of the legitimacy of the aim of the Swiss authorities and the role of the numerical presence of Islam in the underlying Swiss court’s ruling which is upheld by ECtHR.

What divides the ECtHR in religion cases? Study of dissenting opinions in religion cases of the ECtHR sheds a light on dividing lines within the ECtHR and deepens our understanding of the methods of reasoning of the ECtHR itself. Following an analysis of dissenting opinions in religion cases in the rulings of the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, this article focuses on the Chamber. As in the previous analysis, a clear pattern in the dividing lines is brought to light. This article discusses and evaluates this finding.

Religion cases of the European Court of Human Rights are much commented on. A systematic analysis of dissenting opinions in religion cases, however, does not exist. Such analysis can shed light on dividing lines within the ECtHR and deepen our understanding of the methods of reasoning of the ECtHR itself. This article contains analysis of dissenting opinions in the rulings of the Grand Chamber in religion cases. The analysis shows a pattern in the dividing lines. Contrary to the prior expectation, the margin of appreciation as such forms no such dividing line. The article discusses and evaluates the findings.

Recently there’s a lot of debate within the Netherlands about the criminality of assistance by someone who’s not a doctor towards the death of a loved one. In the Heringa lawsuit a son has helped his (step)mother who wished to no longer live (considered her life to be ‘completed’) to die at an age of 99. The helper non-doctor risks criminal pursuit and punishment. The central argument of the lobby to establish a more humane approach towards the persevered need is personal autonomy. This article aims to clarify the debate and to stimulate another way of thinking towards the situation of, mostly, elderly who want to decide and act independently regarding their death.

In this article, the question is raised which constitutional answer to immigration is most sustainable with a view to future multicultural societies. I focus on the constitutional answers to immigration in France, Italy and Canada. In France, in 2010, legislation was adopted prohibiting the wearing of face-covering clothing in public. With this ban, the French intended to enhance the equal participation of citizens in society and to protect the equality of the sexes. In Italy, a heated debate took place about the display of crucifixes in (public) schools, which resulted in a restoration of the predominance of the Catholic religion. Across the ocean, in the Canadian province of Québec, the National Assembly of Québec has been discussing a ‘Charter’, whose prevailing idea is to enhance the neutrality of the state, among others by prohibiting religious clothing in public institutions. The question is which of these approaches is best defensible to regulate a society, which will undoubtedly become even more diverse in the near future.

In 2008 the Party for the Animals in Dutch Parliament submitted a bill on the slaughter of animals without stunning. Initially this bill was formulated as a ban of slaughter without stunning. But then an amendment was included with the clause that this form of slaughter was allowed, provided it can be proven that animal welfare is not more affected than in regular slaughter. This would result in a de facto prohibition. Although the House of Representatives (Tweede Kamer) voted in favor of this bill, it was rejected by the Senate (Eerste Kamer), much to the relief of the Jewish and Muslim communities in the Netherlands. Jews and Muslims must meet with several rules according to their faith while slaughtering animals. One of these rules is that animals are killed without prior stunning. This contribution focuses on arguments regarding animal welfare against and religious arguments for slaughter without stunning.

On the one hand, the religiously motivated circumcision of male minors is a manifestation of the right to freedom of religion. On the other hand, circumcision is an interference with the right to physical integrity. This article makes an effort to explain the fundamental rights’ position of male minor circumcision, dealing as well with the right to freedom of religion of the male minor, with some medical aspects, and with the difference between the circumcision of boys and girls. The article results in a discussion of the question, if specific regulation is required, in view of the recent discussion about the legitimacy of circumcision of male minors.

Religion-related stress is the product of a predominantly secular society in which people are confronted with diverse religious practices. The phenomenon occurs where public meets private. How can employers ensure compliance with conflicting religious and other commitments in the workplace? The concept of respectful pluralism as formulated by Douglas Hicks in his book Religion and the Workplace, may go a long way to negotiating a solution to the debate between conformity and diversity.

This is the second part of an analysis of the use of the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the first part of which appeared in the previous issue of this Journal. This part sets off with a discussion of the use of the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ in cases concerning the place of religion in education. Subsequently, a variety of cases is dealt with that challenge restrictions on religious liberty set by the state or restrictions by third parties tolerated by the state. Finally, this contribution offers an overarching reflection on the use by the ECtHR of the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ in its case law. It concludes that this qualification, which has no explicit treaty basis, is an inadequate standard for use at the international level and that the ECtHR itself is hardly ‘neutral’ in its application of the standard.

The SGP does not allow women to stand for election for general representative political bodies. This position is based on the biblically inspired conviction that the exercise of such elected functions is against the vocation of women, since men and women have different roles in society. The European Court of Human Rights considers this position unacceptable in the light of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (obligation of the states to hold free elections) taken together with Article 14 (right to equal treatment in the enjoyment of Convention rights and freedoms). In a unanimous decision the Court considered the application manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, declared it inadmissible. By doing so, the European Court fails to deal with the real issues at hand and fails to consider the specifics of the case. The mere fact that the highest civil court and the highest administrative court in the Netherlands reached contrary conclusions regarding the human rights dimension of the case already should have led the European Court to deal with case substantively.

It fits in with the objective of the oath that everybody is given the opportunity to swear an oath in compliance with his or her own faith. In The Netherlands this has already been legally possible since 1911. It is in agreement with the articles 1 and 6 of the Constitution and with tradition. After all, those who take the oath must fully realize the obligations they enter into. There is, however, some uncertainty about the scope and purport of the law of 1911. Therefore we are making three recommendations to clarify the rules.

A fundamental principle of a just society is autonomy of societal or communal spheres. This principle contributes to a society in which people develop their own lifestyles according to their own personal convictions. The author argues that such plurality of society will be disrupted if the principle of equality becomes the dominant principle thereby undermining the sovereignty of the communal spheres.