In this article, the Roman perspective on the relations between the Roman imperial cult and monotheistic movements in the same period will be investigated. In modern scholarship, this Roman point of view has been underrepresented. This article will aim to create a better understanding of the religious conflicts that arose between ca. 44 B.C.E. and 313 C.E and serve as an example for attempting to understand the ‘alien’ side in religious conflict. This article will conclude that Roman religion has to be seen in the context of imperial politics to explain not only the conflicts between the Roman state, Jews and Christians, but also the rise of the imperial cult.

The Dutch Social Support Act aims at a bigger role for the civil society in informal care. This appeal includes churches. In this article, the question is: do churches indeed want to participate more in social support? And what is subscribed to churches in the Social Support Act?
Formal documentation of all denominations formulate an active role of churches, both in society in general and more specifically in social support. In national legislation, the Social Support Act does not describe clearly what its expectations of churches are. This is partly so because the Law only gives a general frame for new policy, and local governments make their own policy based on their specific local situation. Local government show a wide variety of possible roles they expect from churches. These roles differ in some aspects from the roles churches describe themselves. Churches themselves do not clearly communicate to governments what they are willing and capable to do in the field of social support; maybe so because they do not realized yet how big the changes induced by the Social Support Act are.

Religion-related stress is the product of a predominantly secular society in which people are confronted with diverse religious practices. The phenomenon occurs where public meets private. How can employers ensure compliance with conflicting religious and other commitments in the workplace? The concept of respectful pluralism as formulated by Douglas Hicks in his book Religion and the Workplace, may go a long way to negotiating a solution to the debate between conformity and diversity.

This is the second part of an analysis of the use of the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the first part of which appeared in the previous issue of this Journal. This part sets off with a discussion of the use of the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ in cases concerning the place of religion in education. Subsequently, a variety of cases is dealt with that challenge restrictions on religious liberty set by the state or restrictions by third parties tolerated by the state. Finally, this contribution offers an overarching reflection on the use by the ECtHR of the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ in its case law. It concludes that this qualification, which has no explicit treaty basis, is an inadequate standard for use at the international level and that the ECtHR itself is hardly ‘neutral’ in its application of the standard.

The chaplaincy in penitentiary institutions shows a peculiar co-operation between the state and the religious communities. The chaplains provide a safe opportunity for supporting the detainees. The growing religious individualisation as well as a political rethinking of the role of religions institutions ask for system adaptations. In particular, the denominational approach is subject to discussion.

Since 2001 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) regularly applies the normative characterization of the state as a ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ in its cases. This qualification has no explicit basis in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Where does it come from, how does the ECtHR understand this, in which type of cases does the ECtHR use it and with which result? This essay analyses the use of this qualification by the ECtHR and aims to provide an answer to these questions. It asserts that the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organiser of religions’ is an inadequate standard and examines wether it may harbor other normative dimensions that are important in the relation between state and religion. After introducing the first case in which the ECtHR used this qualification, the first part deals with cases concerning conflicts within and between churches, equal treatment of religious groups in multi-tiered church and state systems, and pupils in public schools wearing religious garb. The second part will appear in the next issue of this Journal and continues with an analysis of cases concerning the place of religion in education, and various alleged interferences of religious liberty. It concludes with a reflection on the use by the ECtHR of the qualification of the state as ‘neutral and impartial organizer of religious’.