This editorial offers an introduction to the current issue.

Calvinist politicians have traditionally rejected the principle of people’s sovereignty as contrary to God’s sovereignty. However, over time, the majority of these politicians have used the term democracy, which basically means the same, although there has always been a minority seeking a theocracy or a Christian government. Nowadays, Christian politics will not pursue a Christian state, but it pleads for the right to religious liberty in which it finds the key to thinking about human rights and the rule of law.

If one listens to what the authorities say about matters such as female circumcision and terrorism, Islam has nothing to do with it. These authorities are supported in this opinion by the work of many scientists. A cross section of the Dutch scientific literature on female circumcision and terrorism is discussed here. The upshot is that, regarding female circumcision, the literature is plagued with factual inaccuracies while the question of Islamic terrorism is dealt with in a one-sided and over-simplified way. The article concludes with an alternative research agenda that would help fill the gaps in our knowledge about the role of Islam in the behaviour of Islamic terrorists.

Dispute about wearing hats and wearing religious clothes

A fundamental principle of a just society is autonomy of societal or communal spheres. This principle contributes to a society in which people develop their own lifestyles according to their own personal convictions. The author argues that such plurality of society will be disrupted if the principle of equality becomes the dominant principle thereby undermining the sovereignty of the communal spheres.

Since the introduction of the Primary Education Act in 1985, all Dutch primary schools are obliged to teach religious movements as a subject, to make children aware that they are growing up in a multicultural society. Although many schools endorse the idea of education in spiritual movements, recent study shows that currently only 14% of the Dutch primary schools teach all religious movements without focusing on one tradition. This article discuss what the legislator had in mind with the obligation to educate religious movements, what it became in practice and the opportunities schools see for education in religious movements.

According to the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, the obligation to affix crucifixes to the wall of State schools in Italy cannot be considered an infringement of the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their religious and philosophical convictions.

In this contribution the author discusses the broad question whether religious commitment does – or does not – stimulate violent types of criminal behaviour. Based on a review of relevant literature (criminology and religious studies), it is first specified that religious commitment in many respects functions as a protective factor to prevent people from criminal behaviour. By contrast, many orthodox and fundamentalist groups consider defensive violence (self-defense) and punitive violence (retaliation) to be legitimate options. In the final section the author discusses some of the assumed relationships between crime, violence and muslim-radicalism in the Netherlands.

This articles describes fear of religion from the perspective of cultural psychology. Four manifestions of fear of religion are identified: fear of religion = religious awe; fear of religion = fear of a taboo; fear of religion = fear of Islam; fear of religion = fear of abuse. It is argued that the four manifestations at least partially share a common root in societal developments. In the Netherlands, we have created a world-view that centers around the individual, and attributed the individual a role that is independent and dominant in relation to the environment. Traditional religiosity contradicts this world-view, and therefore elicits fear. Religion invalidates our self-image.

In this article I propose an alternative framework for analyzing the Salafi movement by focusing on the practices of meaning-making by and within different networks of the movement. I will show that many practices of the Salafi movement are not problematic for integration per se, but that they produce an alternative vision of the world and re-arrange the daily lives of its participants in such a way that it competes with the state’s vision of good citizenship with its (since 9/11) increasing emphasis on secular and sexual liberties.

The fact that religion is not disappearing but changing, is not necessarily reassuring. We are witnessing a shift towards religion as an identity marker and a lifestyle, leading to new tensions. Religious lifestyles are increasingly perceived as deviant from ‘normality’, and therefore as threatening. Thus, religion becomes object of securitization policies. This article argues that this calls for a double answer. Firstly, a realist assessment is required of whether so-called religious extremism is really threatening, or just unsettling to modern Western perception. Secondly, the whole idea of ‘security’ as policy goal has to be reconsidered, using the alternatives religions present.

Which role do religious beliefs and practices play in radicalization processes of individuals and groups? In the Netherlands, the authorities are not entitled to interfere in religious content, given this content does not undermine democratic order. On the other hand religious orthodoxy is increasingly perceived as a source for violence and coercion in public discourse. Former minister of Justice Ernst Hirsch Ballin argued for a better understanding for the value of religion in society. ICCT-director Peter Knoope explained how the government can enable the development of counternarratives to violent jihadism within the civil society. James Kennedy criticised the fact that religion is increasingly problematized and politicized and argued for a more reluctant and relaxed view on religious radicalization.

Since the 1990s, in the Dutch public debate on the societal meaning of religion a discourse has emerged which does not only relate extremist forms of Islam to terrorism, but more broadly, religious orthodoxy in general to coercion and violence. In this contribution this emergency is described and analyzed. It is related – among other things – to two switches in the perception on orthodox religious groups of prominent opinion leaders, namely: firstly from groups which become less powerful towards groups which become more powerful, and secondly from groups which adapt to their secular and liberal environment towards groups which are characterized by revitalization and radicalization. The upshot of these changes is that religious orthodoxy is framed as a threat that has to be limited and sometimes fought.

This article states how in the Netherlands since the 1990s religious orthodoxy became the reference object for threat analysis within the security domain. Political Islam and Salafism are increasingly framed as security threats to the Dutch democratic order and social cohesion. The article uses the securitization-framework, developed by the Copenhagen School, to analyze how religion was put on the security agenda and how countervailing forces tried to desecuritize and countersecuritize this process. The article ends with the conclusion that orthodoxy as such is still framed predominantly in terms of violence and coercion, due to a culturalization of security politics as a whole. This narrows the perspective on religious orthodoxy and leaves little room for alternative sources of civil engagement in society.

In the recover phase following every disaster or crisis, the challenges are plenty. Government agencies and other organizations and individuals have to deal with activities ranging from medical care for victims, to judicial procedures and environmental cleaning. Religious organizations have important added value in providing spiritual and social care. They might provide necessary information to victims and others who are directly or indirectly affected by a crisis. This is something that needs to be recognized in both planning and recovery activities by local government. A correct diagnose of the recovery phase must include an analysis of the affected groups and the necessary stakeholders.

How can a Christian be devoted to Jesus Christ and his kingdom, while being a good citizin of an earthly kingdom at the same time? Theologians like Bernhard Reitsma and John Howard Yoder argue that this is only possible when a Christian restrains from politics and power. Together with thinkers as Douglas J. Schuurman and John Calvin, this article has a more positive evaluation of the Christian impact on Western culture and encourages Christian responsibility. God does not leave his world alone, therefore Christians should also commit themselves to politics that wants to work on a peaceful society. It is the narrow way between apathy and lust for power.

Provocative anti-religious articles and pictures in the communist newspaper De Tribune incited the Christian majority in the Netherlands’ Parliament in the early thirties of last century to penalizing blasphemy. Jan Donner, minister of Justice, convinced that legal proceedings in reference to blasphemy as such will not stand before court, introduced the crime of brutalizing believing people by mocking their God.

Within municipalities there is much uncertainty as to whether religious organizations may be subsidized or not. It is often thought that the separation between church and state is at stake. Although legalists have addressed this problem before, a link with the everyday practice is often lacking. The flowchart that is created in this article makes a connection between legal science and practical questions policymakers are confronted with. By ‘pouring’ a subsidy request into the chart, it flows past three questions in a preset order. Based on research into (inter)national laws and jurisprudence, it is concluded that religious activities may be subsidized as long as the principles of neutrality, equality and separation between church and state are respected.

In the accommodation of Islam to Europe, policymakers are confronted with the secular identity of the Western-European democracies which, over time, has resulted in diverse church-state regimes serving to shield politics from religion and vice versa.In this article, we examine whether these regimes have resulted in differences concerning the coming together, shape and problems with which representative bodies for the Islamic faith are faced. To do this, we compare the Belgian, Dutch, French, German and English case.Though governments are bound to existing church-state regimes, we note a European trend that questions their influence on said bodies.

Legislative changes with regard to tax exceptions for donations to civil society organisations have created a new fiscal regime (ANBI-regime). Central criterion within this new regime is whether the activities of an organisation are aimed at contributing to the general interest (algemeen belang). This regime poses serious questions for churches and their affiliated organisations as they are no longer de jure being considered as operating in the general interest. Furthermore, the legislator has not established a legal definition of ‘contributing to the general interest’. As a result a steady flow of jurisprudence has developed. In some judgements fiscal criteria seem to collide with the freedom of religion.