For liberals religion is a private matter. This does not mean that a citizen should leave his or her religion at home. It does mean that laws and public services should not be determined by religious beliefs. The article describes how liberals have looked upon religion in their programs of principles since mid 19th century. The educational arrangement in the Netherlands of 1917, favouring religious schools, did not satisfy them. What were the liberal proposals in order to safeguard the religiously neutral, publicly-maintained schools?

Appeals to religion in the public domain, in particular by politicians, prove to be controversial. This is good news, given that the ensuing debate usually uncovers forgotten aspects of religious traditions. Using three cases from the Dutch political discourse, to wit: the appeal to ‘Jewish Christian’ tradition, the claim that Jewish Christian tradition has been of key emancipatory value, and the identification of immigrants as religious, and applying Aleida Assmann’s theory about the dynamics of forgetting (and remembrance), the paper demonstrates that in each of these cases, the public debates surrounding these instances of references to religion and their rhetorical use, were instrumental in uncovering ‘forgotten’ aspects of religion that had disappeared from the ‘memory’ of the political discourse.

Some religious persons refuse to undergo certain medical treatments such as vaccinations or blood transfusions. They refuse treatment not only for themselves but for their children as well. Many fundamental rights may be at stake here: freedom of religion, the right to physical integrity and respect for family life on the one hand, and the duty of public authorities to provide for health care and defend children’s rights on the other. The main topic of this contribution is the extent to which the government is allowed to make certain treatments compulsory.

The liberal stance regarding religious freedom starts from a particular anthropology, which holds that in order to become fully human citizens must be able to build their lives on the foundations of their religious convictions. This starting point leads to distinctive conceptions of constitutionalism and democracy that make it possible for citizens to keep faith in liberal democracy. The so-called new critics of religious freedom, to the contrary, run the risk of eventually eroding trust in government by putting their substantial ideas of liberal democracy first and demanding of citizens and their organizations to act in conformity with these ideas.

Two new rulings by the European Court of Human Rights confirm earlier jurisprudence regarding the ‘burqa ban’, as such ban is justified on the basis of the principle of ‘living together’. Still, two points stand out in these rulings that need discussion. The first is that this is an example of how the Court applies its new ‘qualitative, democracy-enhancing approach’ that pays more consideration to domestic decision-making in the field of human rights. These rulings show the flipside of this laudable endeavour, however, as the Court sees no reason to evaluate, let alone critically assess, the outcome of these domestic decision-making processes. Second, the remarkable ‘concurring opinion’ by the president of the ruling judges, in which he states in very stern wordings that the ruling should not be considered a cart blanche for burqa bans elsewhere. Given the elaborate considerations why such ban would not be admissible, it is surprising that the Court has failed to elaborate why the burqa bans in France and Belgium are admissible.

The term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ dates from the second half of the twentieth century, but has of recent gained in popularity with politicians and policy makers. It seems to be no coincidence that this has a direct correlation with the debates on the position of Islam in Europe. This article is a critical assessment of the meanings of the various elements of this term: what is so Christian about European civilization, what is Judaism’s part therein, and what role does the Islam play? It is notable that one often considers this Judeo Christian ‘culture’ or ‘civilization’ as an uninterupted historical proces, while the second half of the twentieth century shows a clear rupture when it concerns values or the experience of religion. Also remarkable is that one often fails to make the differentiation between religion as a theological cult and as a culture carrier, or between the principles and the practice of a religion. As a consequence, the term ‘Judeo Christian civilization’ or ‘culture’ is being used in a very sloppy or selective manner, often with the purpose to exclude Islam.

The Dutch freedom to set up schools has become illusory. The foundation standards (the number of students) are high and the current interpretation of the concept of direction (religion or philosophy of life) does not seem to be sufficiently connected with today’s pluriform society. The alternative of direction-free planning of schools had practical and fundamental objections. Parent statements are insufficiently reliable and a school without direction does not have a foundation. An extension of direction is neither without disadvantages: the government will have to test whether there is a sufficiently coherent concept to be able to count as a direction.

Recently the Dutch parliament passed a law that provides the subsidy for religious and humanist education in state schools. The law on primary education gives to the parents the right to ask for it. Religious education in state schools exists in the Netherlands since the beginning of the 19th century, optional and taught by representatives of the church. So it is appropriate for the state school which wish to be a school for everyone. And public funding is appropriate in the Dutch education system.

This article discusses the way in which nominally liberal, secular political parties in the Netherlands refer to religion when describing Dutch national identity with particular emphasis on controversies surrounding the 2017 parliamentary elections. Focussing on the currently ruling liberal party VVD and the populist right-wing party PVV, appeals on ‘judeo-christian roots’ and the importance of christian symbols are analyzed against the backdrop of larger currents of religious-secular developments in (inter)national political discourse. The author suggest using the term ‘postsecular nationalism’ to describe this development. The article ends with speculation on the impact of postsecular nationalism for policy-makers.

This article explores three perspectives of tradition and their consequences for the relationship between law and religion. A religious tradition can be seen either as a remnant of the past, separate from modern law, or as an authoritative source of moral prescriptions. The analysis of a literary tradition demonstrates that traditions influence each other and develop in a cyclical way. Tradition comes about as a construction by the present of the past. This third perspective shows the importance of the acknowledgment of law as an open platform for deliberation and recognition of religious values.

John Calvin had the view that church and state formed a spiritual unity. His followers accepted step by step the equal right for protestants and catholic in public society. Their arguments for this were mainly practical. Biblical arguments, as the parable of the tare in the field, played a minor role. Not earlier than in the 19th century public tolerance was a fundamental choice for neo-calvinists.

In August 2016 the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) ruled that Scientology could not be recognised as a civil society organisation that can benefit from tax exemptions for donations (the so called: ANBI-status). The majority of the activities of Scientology consist of courses of auditing and training at high rates with the purpose of creating large financial buffers for Scientology. The Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeal, which adopted a comparative method using commercial rates, that these specific activities do not serve the general interest, but serve the individual interest of Scientology.

The Netherlands changed from a culturally homogenous society into a religiously plural society. This had an impact across public and denominational schools. The pluralisation of the pupil population raised the issue of the so-called pillarized educational system. In this contribution I explore this theme in the context of the freedom of education laid down in article 23 of the Dutch Constitution, and the right of every child to get acquainted with the diversity of its society’s traditions, and to position itself in the plural Dutch society. Moving beyond the pillarized system, all education can then become truly special, preparing children for normative citizenship.

In the context of the project Careful Church the Protestant Church in the Netherlands has developed pilot projects in the field of care and welfare in eighteen local churches. The aim of these is to get learning experiences to determine her position in local society. A description is given of these pilots and of the most important experiences. It is of relevance also on basis of contacts with organisations and local authorities to develop a plan of action. Most activities have to do with creating rooms for encounter and with assisting people who are dependent on care. In this way churches can be a relevant actor in local society with meaningful and small scale activities.

The article analyzes the legal integration of religion and worldview communication in secular care contexts in Germany and the Netherlands. The constitutional position of spiritual care and healthcare chaplaincy and the organization of the religious field are diverse in these states. This creates a variety of correlation between the religious and the medical domain within healthcare institutions in both countries. The analysis leads to the question, how the observed differences work out in organization and policy concretely. Finely, there are some conclusions drawn out of the comparison.

Islamic scripture provides no definition of the caliphate and the term ‘Islamic state’ was coined for the first time in 1941. Pakistan and Iran call themselves an ‘Islamic republic,’ and ISIS has named itself an ‘Islamic State’ headed by a caliph. For many Muslims the term represents an ideal of a society that is just, peaceful and prosperous. That looks more like a utopian dream. So what is this Islamic state exactly? In this article we will answer that question by means of three approaches: the tenets of Islam, the historical and modern reality, and the wishes of the modern Muslims.

In a unanimous decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has accepted the refusal of an exemption of compulsory mixed swimming lessons for elementary school girls in Switzerland. The exemption was requested by the parents of the two girls as the requirement to let their daughters participate in those lessons was contrary to their religious conviction. The author discusses the decision in the light of national debates on integration and subscribes its outcome. Specific attention is paid to the ECtHR’s interpretation of the legitimacy of the aim of the Swiss authorities and the role of the numerical presence of Islam in the underlying Swiss court’s ruling which is upheld by ECtHR.