In countries like Belgium and The Netherlands, there seems to be overwhelming public acceptance of transplantation and organ donation. Yet, paradoxically, part of the public refuses post-mortal donation of their own organs or of those of family members. It is customary within the transplantation context to accept the refusal of organ donation by family members “in order to accommodate their feelings”. I argue that this attitude does not take seriously what is really behind the refusal of donation by (at least some) family members. My hypothesis is that even in very secularized societies, this refusal is determined by cultural-symbolic attitudes vis-à-vis the (dead) human body (and some of its parts). The blind spot for this reality, both in the practice of and discussions around organ donation, prevents understanding of what is producing the paradox mentioned. |
Zoekresultaat: 3 artikelen
De zoekresultaten worden gefilterd op:Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy x
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Tijdschrift | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2020 |
Trefwoorden | organ donation, ethics of organ donation, symbolic nature of the human body, ethics and ritual, symbolic legislation theory |
Auteurs | Herman De Dijn |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
Artikel |
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Tijdschrift | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2017 |
Trefwoorden | empirical legal studies, apologies, procedural justice, humiliation, victim rights |
Auteurs | Vincent Geeraets en Wouter Veraart |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
The central question in this article is whether an empirical-legal approach of victimhood and victim rights could offer a sufficient basis for proposals of legal reform of the legal system. In this article, we choose a normative-critical approach and raise some objections to the way in which part of such research is currently taking place in the Netherlands, on the basis of two examples of research in this field, one dealing with compelled apologies as a possible remedy within civil procedural law and the other with the victim’s right to be heard within the criminal legal procedure. In both cases, we argue, the strong focus on the measurable needs of victims can lead to a relatively instrumental view of the legal system. The legal system must then increasingly be tailored to the wishes and needs of victims. Within this legal-empirical, victim-oriented approach, there is little regard for the general normative principles of our present legal system, in which an equal and respectful treatment of each human being as a free and responsible legal subject is a central value. We argue that results of empirical-legal research should not too easily or too quickly be translated into proposals for legal reform, but first become part of a hermeneutical discussion about norms and legal principles, specific to the normative quality of legal science itself. |
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Tijdschrift | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2012 |
Trefwoorden | Drittwirkung, horizontal effect of human rights, constitutionalisation of private law |
Auteurs | Stefan Somers |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
This article discusses whether the horizontal effect of human rights marks a new paradigm in legal systems or is merely a new style in legal rhetoric. In doing so, much attention is paid to the differences between direct and indirect horizontal effect. Departing from social contract theory the article explains that the protection of human right values in horizontal relations is an essential feature of modern constitutionalism. It also analyses whether these values in horizontal relations should be protected by private law or by human rights. This question is looked at from a substantial, a methodological and an institutional perspective. In the end, because of institutional power balancing, the article argues in favor of an indirect horizontal effect of human rights. |