This article contains a critical review of the provisions in the Dutch penal code regarding group defamation and hate speech. It is argued that not only these provisions themselves but also their application by the Dutch supreme court, constitutes a problem for the legitimacy and functioning of representative democracy. This is due to the tendency of the supreme court to employ special constraints for offensive, hateful or discriminatory speech by politicians. Because such a special constraint is not provided or even implied by the legislator, the jurisprudence of the supreme court is likely to end up in judicial overreach and therefore constitutes a potential – if not actual – breach in the separation of powers. In order to forestall these consequences, the protection of particularly political speech should be improved, primarily by a revision of the articles 137c and 137d of the Dutch penal code or the extension of parliamentary immunity.

Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp is the auctor intellectualis of the 1818 Dutch constitution. It was his sketch for a new constitution that was used as a starting point for the deliberations of its original drafting committee. Van Hogendorp justifies his constitution as a restoration of the Burgundian constitution that applied before the Dutch Republic. In recent literature Van Hogendorp’s restorational argument is presented as an invention of tradition. In this article an alternative explanation is presented, namely that it is part of a form of classicist political thought that was common during the ancien régime. Van Hogendorp describes his constitution as a moderate monarchy, in which the three principles of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy are properly balanced. And he mainly defends this mixed regime by pointing out that it is a restoration of the old Burgundian constitution of the Netherlands. This way of reasoning is, as will be shown, typically classicistic.

De Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts (VWR) is opgericht op 28 december 1918. Zij had tot doel de studie van de rechtsfilosofie en het maatschappelijk leven. Deze studie moest tevens relevant zijn voor de rechtspraktijk. Vanaf haar oprichting kende de VWR een sterke internationale oriëntatie, aanvankelijk gericht op Duitsland, later vooral op het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de VS. In de jaren zeventig en tachtig van de vorige eeuw beleefde de VWR wat betreft belangstelling en ledenaantal haar hoogtepunt. In 2016 besloot zij – na een gestage neergang – de band met de Nederlandstalige (praktijk)jurist weer aan te halen.

In dit artikel wordt de waarde van het instituut parlement verkend. Daartoe analyseert de auteur eerst een lezing die de Nederlandse staatsrechtsgeleerde C.W. van der Pot in 1925 over dit thema hield bij de VWR. Vervolgens wordt Van der Pots opvatting gecontrasteerd met de diametraal tegengestelde benadering van Carl Schmitt, die zich, rond dezelfde tijd, over dit vraagstuk boog in Duitsland. Tot slot schetst de auteur, via een alternatieve, wellicht excentrieke, interpretatie van Schmitt waar een belangrijke waarde van het moderne parlement zou kunnen liggen.

In dit artikel wordt langs wijsgerige weg de verhouding tussen tijd, identiteit en het verlenen van (sterkere) verblijfsaanspraken aan migranten onderzocht en verhelderd door een nieuwe betekenis van de term worteling voor te stellen. Want wat is worteling nu eigenlijk? Het is de relatie tussen menselijke tijd, worteling en het migratierecht die in dit artikel filosofisch wordt uitgediept. Dit om te verklaren waarom we in het migratierecht vreemdelingen in het algemeen na verloop van tijd sterkere aanspraken verlenen. In dit artikel wordt betoogd dat het verblijf van vreemdelingen op het grondgebied ervoor zorgt dat hun leven aldaar na verloop van tijd een vanzelfsprekend onderdeel uitmaakt van hun identiteit, en van het leven van anderen. Het is dit vanzelfsprekend worden van mensen door de tijd dat de grond is voor het bestaan van formele tijdscriteria voor insluiting in het migratierecht.

In this contribution, the Dutch government’s acceptance of ethical hacking, by implementing a policy of responsible disclosure, is considered to be a beneficent development. Ethical hacking contributes to cybersecurity and is intrinsically desirable. The term positive incitement is proposed to describe the relatively new phenomenon of encouraging ethical hacking. Positive incitement will be analysed by making a comparison to the Dutch toleration policy regarding soft drugs, and to incitement by law enforcement. Positive incitement should not change into negative incitement, which would result in a serious breach of the rights of ethical hackers. Furthermore, it is argued that the intrinsic value of ethical hacking can justify searching for vulnerabilities in systems of organisations who do not approve of this in advance.

In dit artikel presenteer ik een nieuwe ‘nominalistische’ theorie van de rechtssubjecten en laat ik zien waarom geen van de tot nu gepresenteerde theorieën de toets der kritiek kan doorstaan. Het artikel valt uiteen in een constructief en een kritisch deel. In het constructieve deel presenteer ik eerst de nominalistische theorie van de rechtssubjecten. Deze theorie richt zich op de persoonlijke elementen van het rechtssysteem en begrijpt rechtspersonen en organen als namen die uitsluitend bestaan binnen het rechtssysteem. In het kritische deel presenteer ik vervolgens een overzicht van de tot nu toe verdedigde theorieën van de rechtspersoon. Het gaat daarbij respectievelijk om de sociaal-biologische of organische leer, de sociologische leer, de sociologisch-juridische leer, de fictieleer en de leer van het (gepersonifieerde) normencomplex. Aan de hand van enkele algemeen geaccepteerde kenmerken van de rechtspersoon laat ik ten slotte zien waarom geen van deze alternatieve theorieën de toets der kritiek kan doorstaan.

I will argue that it is possible to give a neutral or antiperfectionist legitimation for state support for religion, which I consider a perfectionist good that is not in the common interest. I will argue that state support for perfectionist goods (and thus also for religion) can, in some circumstances and under certain conditions, be allowed as a second-best option in order to guarantee an adequate range of valuable options to choose among - and this range of options is a necessary condition for autonomy. Subsequently, I will argue that the bottom line - which is also the limit - for support is a sufficient range of valuable options. Furthermore, I will argue that state support for religion is only allowed if there is a democratic consensus about the value of that particular perfectionist good. Finally, I will claim that state support for religion is only allowed under certain conditions.

In this article, we inquire the merits of criminalizing blasphemy. We argue that religious views do not warrant a separate treatment compared to nonreligious ones. In addition, freedom of speech must be balanced against the interest of those who may be aggrieved by blasphemous remarks. We conclude that penalizing blasphemy is undesirable. It is fortunate, in that light, that acts of blasphemy have recently been decriminalized in The Netherlands by removing blasphemy as an offense from the Criminal Code. Still, other provisions appear to leave enough room to reach the same result, making the removal a possibly virtually aesthetic change. In the international context, it would be regrettable for The Netherlands to forgo the opportunity to take a leading role.

This article explores the themes of injustice and dehumanization in Aeschylus’ Oresteia and Yael Farber’s Molora, in which the story of the Oresteia is dramatized against the backdrop of post-apartheid South Africa. It is argued that both plays depict wrongdoers and victims alike as social outcasts. Thus, they can both be described with Paul Ricoeur as ‘sketches of a man,’ not being able to live up to their full human potential. Borrowing from Ricoeur’s legal philosophy, it is then explained how public trials and hearings help them to reintegrate into society, in which they can regain their full humanity.

This article discusses whether the horizontal effect of human rights marks a new paradigm in legal systems or is merely a new style in legal rhetoric. In doing so, much attention is paid to the differences between direct and indirect horizontal effect. Departing from social contract theory the article explains that the protection of human right values in horizontal relations is an essential feature of modern constitutionalism. It also analyses whether these values in horizontal relations should be protected by private law or by human rights. This question is looked at from a substantial, a methodological and an institutional perspective. In the end, because of institutional power balancing, the article argues in favor of an indirect horizontal effect of human rights.

The author argues that normative questions in social law are in need of a more philosophical approach. This is particularly true for the evaluation of Work-first arrangements. She proposes to evaluate workfare policies from the perspective of the reciprocity principle as it is deployed in the work of the liberal egalitarians John Rawls and Stuart White. While Rawls’ interpretation of the reciprocity principle seems to be at odds with Dutch jurisprudence on workfare policies, which allows for Work-first arrangements within the boundaries that are set by article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (a prohibition on compulsory labor), White’s approach rather encourages work obligations for welfare recipients, on the condition that citizens acquire individual drawing rights on collective participation funds.

In this article, the authors explore how active state support for religions and worldviews could be in accordance with the principle of liberal neutrality. They focus on the Belgian church-state policy because this policy is characterised by an explicit and extended form of active support for recognised worldviews. If this policy is in accordance with liberal neutrality, some other, weaker forms of state support for religions and worldviews may also be in accordance with this neutrality principle. In the light of these considerations, the authors make some suggestions about possible ways to bring the Belgian church-state policy more in accordance with liberal neutrality.

Does populism add value to the political debate by showing that the ideals of Enlightenment are too abstract and rationalist to understand politics in democratic terms? The paper argues two theses, critically engaging Lefort’s work: (i) instead of offering valuable criticism, populism feeds on the very principle that Enlightenment has introduced: a polity rests on self-inclusion with reference to a quasi-transcendent realm; (ii) populism’s appeal to simple emotions feeds on the vitalist (rather than merely institutionalist) pulse in any polity. Both dimensions of politics are inevitable as well as elusive. In particular with regard to the vitalist pulse we have no response to the half-truths of populism, as both national and constitutional patriotism seem on the wrong track.

There are two fundamental problems with regard to the freedom of religion. The first concerns the content and scope of the right; the second, a possible unequal treatment between population groups. The first problem can only be dealt with by a preliminary analysis of the religious phenomenon, which precedes a legal definition. It turns out that there is a range of different types of religion, with on the one hand traditional forms of religion which are narrowly interwoven with the culture in question (all kinds of ‘cultural’ practices possessing a religious dimension), and on the other forms of religion which loosen to a considerable extent the ties between culture and religion. Evidently, the former types of religion cause problems in modern society. An additional problem is that freedom of religion as a modern basic right rests on a view of human being – including the idea of the inherent dignity and autonomy of the human person – which is at odds with the symbolic universe of traditional religion. The conclusion of the article is that in the modern pluralist society freedom of religion is on its way to becoming, or already has become, an unmanageable right. So the problems arising around this right (including that of unequal treatment) can only be solved in a pragmatic, not really satisfactory way. In that context, modern humanitarian standards should be observed in the implementation of the right of freedom of religion because fundamental human rights are connected with a specific concept of humanity.