In my response to Duff I focus mainly on the following two issues. Firstly, I examine what kind of a norm the presumption of innocence (PoI) really is and how it ontologically differs from other types of rules, principles, rationales, etc. My tentative conclusion is that a PoI does not suffice the requirement of being a dogmatic rule and, thus, has less weight than what Duff perhaps assumes. |
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Tijdschrift | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2013 |
Trefwoorden | rules, principles, fairness, PoI |
Auteurs | Magnus Ulväng |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
Artikel |
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Tijdschrift | Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2013 |
Trefwoorden | Honneth, Hegel, social freedom, legal freedom, law, pathologies |
Auteurs | Jan Ph. Broekhuizen |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
In Das Recht der Freiheit Axel Honneth develops his concept of social freedom. In this article I discuss Honneth’s project and critique one of its crucial aspects: Honneth’s views on the disruptive role of legal freedom in our society and its dependent relation to the sphere of social freedom. I argue that in his attempt in Das Recht der Freiheit to reactualize Hegel’s discourse on the realization of freedom for our time, Honneth risks mistranslating Hegel’s discourse of ‘right’ by denying the sphere of legal relations a constitutive role for true freedom, and that because of this Honneth’s own theory of social freedom suffers: it becomes less clear whether it can still offer helpful insights into the proper place of legal freedom in our society. |