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Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy x Jaar 2014 x
Artikel

Access_open The Experience of Legal Injustice

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden legal injustice, legal subject, law and morality, Fuller, Arendt
Auteurs Wouter Veraart
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This paper shows that Fuller and Arendt converge on a different point than the point Rundle focuses on. What Fuller and Arendt seem to share in their legal thoughts is not so much an interest in the experience of law-as-such (the interaction between responsible agency and law as a complex institution), but rather an interest in the junction of law and injustice. By not sufficiently focusing on the experience of legal injustice, Rundle overlooks an important point of divergence between Arendt and Fuller. In particular, Arendt differs from Fuller in her conviction that ‘injustice in a legal form’ is an integral part of modern legal systems.


Wouter Veraart
Wouter Veraart is Professor of Legal Philosophy and Director of Research at the Free University Amsterdam; w.j.veraart@vu.nl.
Artikel

Access_open Reply

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Fuller, Arendt, normativism, methodology, the rule of law
Auteurs Kristen Rundle
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    Author’s reply to four commentaries on ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons: Developing Public Legal Theory through Fuller and Arendt.’


Kristen Rundle
Kristen Rundle is Senior Lecturer of Law at the University of New South Wales; k.rundle@unsw.edu.au
Artikel

Access_open Fuller and Arendt: A Happy Marriage? Comment on Rundle

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Fuller, Arendt, Radbruch, legal certainty
Auteurs Thomas Mertens
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    In her paper, Rundle seeks to develop a normative legal theory that is distinctively public. Building on her book, Forms Liberate, she seeks to bring Fuller’s legal theory into conversation with Arendt’s political theory. In this comment, I present some hesitations with regard to the fruitfulness of this conversation. It concludes with the suggestion to explore how Radbruch’s ‘idea of law’ could be fruitful for the overall jurisprudential project Rundle seeks to develop in her work.


Thomas Mertens
Thomas Mertens is Professor of Philosophy of Law at Radboud University Nijmegen; t.mertens@jur.ru.nl
Artikel

Access_open Political Jurisprudence or Institutional Normativism? Maintaining the Difference Between Arendt and Fuller

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Arendt, Fuller, Hobbes, political jurisprudence, political freedom, authority, legality
Auteurs Michael Wilkinson
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Can jurisprudence fruitfully pursue a synthesis of Arendt’s political theory and Fuller’s normative legal philosophy? Might their ideas of the juridical person and the legal subject be aligned as a result of a shared concern for the value of legality, specifically of an institutional complex which is structured through the stability and predictability of the rule of law? It is doubtful that Arendt's concern for the phenomena of plurality, political freedom and action can usefully be brought into line with Fuller's normativist focus on legality, subjectivity and the inner morality of law. This doubt is explored by juxtaposing Arendt's theory of action and her remarks on the revolution, foundation and augmentation of power and authority with Fuller's philosophy that, however critical of its positivist adversaries, remains ultimately tied to a Hobbesian tradition which views authority and power in abstract, hierarchical and individualist terms.


Michael Wilkinson
Michael Wilkinson is Associate Professor of Law at the London School of Economics; m.wilkinson@lse.ac.uk
Artikel

Access_open Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons: Developing Public Legal Theory through Fuller and Arendt

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Fuller, Arendt, legal subject, juridical person, public rule of law theory
Auteurs Kristen Rundle
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The ‘public’ character of the kind of rule of law theorizing with which Lon Fuller was engaged is signalled especially in his attention to the very notion of being a ’legal subject’ at all. This point is central to the aim of this paper to explore the animating commitments, of substance and method alike, of a particular direction of legal theorizing: one which commences its inquiry from an assessment of conditions of personhood within a public legal frame. Opening up this inquiry to resources beyond Fuller, the paper makes a novel move in its consideration of how the political theorist Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the ‘juridical person’ might aid a legal theoretical enterprise of this kind.


Kristen Rundle
Kristen Rundle is Senior Lecturer of Law at the University of New South Wales; k.rundle@unsw.edu.au

    Introduction to this special issue of NJLP.


Morag Goodwin
Morag Goodwin is Associate Professor of International Law at Tilburg University; m.e.a.goodwin@uvt.nl.

Michiel Besters
Michiel Besters is a Ph.D. researcher in Legal Philosophy at Tilburg University; m.besters@uvt.nl.

Rudolf Rijgersberg
Rudolf Rijgersberg is Assistant Professor of Foundation and Methods of Law at Maastricht University; rudolf.rijgersberg@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
Artikel

Access_open Lawyers Doing Philosophy

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden human agency, legal doctrine, command theory of law, Fuller, Arendt
Auteurs Pauline Westerman
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Rundle criticizes the command conception of law by means of Fuller’s and Arendt’s concept of human agency. However, neither of these two authors derive law from human agency, as Rundle seems to think. Instead they stress that personhood can only be attributed to physical human beings on the basis of law. Moreover, their theories cannot be understood as answers to Rundle’s question – whatever that may be – but as answers to their own questions and concerns. In the case of Arendt and Fuller, these concerns were so different that the enterprise to reconcile them seems futile. Rundle’s approach can be understood as the attempt to deal with philosophy as if it were legal doctrine.


Pauline Westerman
Pauline Westerman is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Groningen; p.c.westerman@rug.nl
Artikel

Access_open Racial Profiling and the Presumption of Innocence

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden racial profiling, stop-and-frisk, presumption of innocence, communicative theories of criminal law, social inequality and criminal law
Auteurs Peter DeAngelis
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    I argue that a compelling way to articulate what is wrong with racial profiling in policing is to view racial profiling as a violation of the presumption of innocence. I discuss the communicative nature of the presumption of innocence as an expression of social trust and a protection against the social condemnation of being undeservingly investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a crime. I argue that, given its communicative dimension, failures to extend the presumption of innocence are an expression of disrespect. I take the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy as an example of racial profiling and argue that its use of race-based forms of suspicion as reasons for making stops is a violation of the presumption of innocence. I maintain that this systemic failure to extend the presumption of innocence to profiled groups reveals the essentially disrespectful nature of the NYPD policy.


Peter DeAngelis
Peter DeAngelis is Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy at Villanova University.
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