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Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy x Jaar 2014 x
Artikel

Access_open The Experience of Legal Injustice

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden legal injustice, legal subject, law and morality, Fuller, Arendt
Auteurs Wouter Veraart
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    This paper shows that Fuller and Arendt converge on a different point than the point Rundle focuses on. What Fuller and Arendt seem to share in their legal thoughts is not so much an interest in the experience of law-as-such (the interaction between responsible agency and law as a complex institution), but rather an interest in the junction of law and injustice. By not sufficiently focusing on the experience of legal injustice, Rundle overlooks an important point of divergence between Arendt and Fuller. In particular, Arendt differs from Fuller in her conviction that ‘injustice in a legal form’ is an integral part of modern legal systems.


Wouter Veraart
Wouter Veraart is Professor of Legal Philosophy and Director of Research at the Free University Amsterdam; w.j.veraart@vu.nl.
Artikel

Access_open Reply

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Fuller, Arendt, normativism, methodology, the rule of law
Auteurs Kristen Rundle
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    Author’s reply to four commentaries on ‘Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons: Developing Public Legal Theory through Fuller and Arendt.’


Kristen Rundle
Kristen Rundle is Senior Lecturer of Law at the University of New South Wales; k.rundle@unsw.edu.au
Artikel

Access_open Fuller and Arendt: A Happy Marriage? Comment on Rundle

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Fuller, Arendt, Radbruch, legal certainty
Auteurs Thomas Mertens
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    In her paper, Rundle seeks to develop a normative legal theory that is distinctively public. Building on her book, Forms Liberate, she seeks to bring Fuller’s legal theory into conversation with Arendt’s political theory. In this comment, I present some hesitations with regard to the fruitfulness of this conversation. It concludes with the suggestion to explore how Radbruch’s ‘idea of law’ could be fruitful for the overall jurisprudential project Rundle seeks to develop in her work.


Thomas Mertens
Thomas Mertens is Professor of Philosophy of Law at Radboud University Nijmegen; t.mertens@jur.ru.nl
Artikel

Access_open Political Jurisprudence or Institutional Normativism? Maintaining the Difference Between Arendt and Fuller

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Arendt, Fuller, Hobbes, political jurisprudence, political freedom, authority, legality
Auteurs Michael Wilkinson
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    Can jurisprudence fruitfully pursue a synthesis of Arendt’s political theory and Fuller’s normative legal philosophy? Might their ideas of the juridical person and the legal subject be aligned as a result of a shared concern for the value of legality, specifically of an institutional complex which is structured through the stability and predictability of the rule of law? It is doubtful that Arendt's concern for the phenomena of plurality, political freedom and action can usefully be brought into line with Fuller's normativist focus on legality, subjectivity and the inner morality of law. This doubt is explored by juxtaposing Arendt's theory of action and her remarks on the revolution, foundation and augmentation of power and authority with Fuller's philosophy that, however critical of its positivist adversaries, remains ultimately tied to a Hobbesian tradition which views authority and power in abstract, hierarchical and individualist terms.


Michael Wilkinson
Michael Wilkinson is Associate Professor of Law at the London School of Economics; m.wilkinson@lse.ac.uk
Artikel

Access_open Legal Subjects and Juridical Persons: Developing Public Legal Theory through Fuller and Arendt

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden Fuller, Arendt, legal subject, juridical person, public rule of law theory
Auteurs Kristen Rundle
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    The ‘public’ character of the kind of rule of law theorizing with which Lon Fuller was engaged is signalled especially in his attention to the very notion of being a ’legal subject’ at all. This point is central to the aim of this paper to explore the animating commitments, of substance and method alike, of a particular direction of legal theorizing: one which commences its inquiry from an assessment of conditions of personhood within a public legal frame. Opening up this inquiry to resources beyond Fuller, the paper makes a novel move in its consideration of how the political theorist Hannah Arendt’s reflections on the ‘juridical person’ might aid a legal theoretical enterprise of this kind.


Kristen Rundle
Kristen Rundle is Senior Lecturer of Law at the University of New South Wales; k.rundle@unsw.edu.au

    Introduction to this special issue of NJLP.


Morag Goodwin
Morag Goodwin is Associate Professor of International Law at Tilburg University; m.e.a.goodwin@uvt.nl.

Michiel Besters
Michiel Besters is a Ph.D. researcher in Legal Philosophy at Tilburg University; m.besters@uvt.nl.

Rudolf Rijgersberg
Rudolf Rijgersberg is Assistant Professor of Foundation and Methods of Law at Maastricht University; rudolf.rijgersberg@maastrichtuniversity.nl.
Artikel

Access_open Lawyers Doing Philosophy

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 3 2014
Trefwoorden human agency, legal doctrine, command theory of law, Fuller, Arendt
Auteurs Pauline Westerman
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    Rundle criticizes the command conception of law by means of Fuller’s and Arendt’s concept of human agency. However, neither of these two authors derive law from human agency, as Rundle seems to think. Instead they stress that personhood can only be attributed to physical human beings on the basis of law. Moreover, their theories cannot be understood as answers to Rundle’s question – whatever that may be – but as answers to their own questions and concerns. In the case of Arendt and Fuller, these concerns were so different that the enterprise to reconcile them seems futile. Rundle’s approach can be understood as the attempt to deal with philosophy as if it were legal doctrine.


Pauline Westerman
Pauline Westerman is Professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Groningen; p.c.westerman@rug.nl
Artikel

Access_open Private law as an open legal order: understanding contract and tort as interactional law

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2014
Trefwoorden contract law, Fuller, informal law, pragmatism, rules versus standards
Auteurs Prof Sanne Taekema PhD
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    This article puts forward the claim that private law, and especially contract and tort, is the area of law that most clearly shows how law depends on social interactions. Taking its cue from Lon Fuller, interactional law is presented as a form of law that depends on informal social practices. Using tort and contract cases, it is argued that this implies that law is in open connection to moral norms and values, and that law cannot be understood without taking into account people’s everyday reciprocal expectancies.


Prof Sanne Taekema PhD
Sanne Taekema is Professor of Jurisprudence, Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University of Rotterdam. Her current research is oriented to the rule of law in a global context and to methodological and conceptual issues pertaining to interdisciplinary rule of law.

Willem Witteveen PhD
Artikel

Access_open The Public Conscience of the Law

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2014
Trefwoorden Hobbes, reciprocity, rule of Law, conscience, legality, liberty
Auteurs David Dyzenhaus PhD
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    I focus on Hobbes’s claim that the law is ’the publique Conscience, by which [the individual] (…) hath already undertaken to be guided.’ This claim is not authoritarian once it is set in the context of his complex account, which involves three different relationships of reciprocity: the contractarian idea that individuals in the state of nature agree with one another to institute a sovereign whose prescriptions they shall regard as binding; the vertical, reciprocal relationship between ruler and ruled; and the horizontal relationship between individuals in the civil condition, made possible by the existence of the sovereign who through enacting laws dictates the terms of interaction between his subjects. The interaction of these three relationships has the result that subjects relate to each other on terms that reflect their status as free and equal individuals who find that the law enables them to pursue their own conceptions of the good.


David Dyzenhaus PhD
David Dyzenhaus is a Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. His books include Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (now in its second edition) and Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in Weimar.
Artikel

Access_open Idealized versus Real-Life Reciprocity: How to Strike the Balance?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2014
Trefwoorden norm of reciprocity, moral obligation, gift exchange, hospitality, intergenerational relations
Auteurs Mrs. Aafke Elisabeth Komter PhD
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    Rawls’s ’idealized’ notion of reciprocity is compared with the ’real-life’ concept of reciprocity as it has been developed in social scientific theory. The two perspectives appear to differ significantly as concerns dimensions related to equality, human motivation, the temporal aspects of reciprocity, and the supposed mental origin of reciprocity. Whereas norms of obligation and feelings of moral indebtedness are constitutive for reciprocity in real-life encounters, equality, freedom and rationality are the basis for reciprocity in the hypothetical world of the ’conjectural account’. Rather than being fundamentally incompatible, the idealized and the real-life perspectives on reciprocity seem to apply to different spheres of social life, the first requiring greater formality and universality than the second, which allows for more variation and particularities.


Mrs. Aafke Elisabeth Komter PhD
Aafke Komter is Emeritus Professor of Social Sciences and a Visiting Researcher at the Department of Sociology of the Erasmus University of Rotterdam. She has published many articles on (family) solidarity, reciprocity and the social and cultural meaning of the exchange of gifts.
Artikel

Access_open Racial Profiling and the Presumption of Innocence

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden racial profiling, stop-and-frisk, presumption of innocence, communicative theories of criminal law, social inequality and criminal law
Auteurs Peter DeAngelis
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    I argue that a compelling way to articulate what is wrong with racial profiling in policing is to view racial profiling as a violation of the presumption of innocence. I discuss the communicative nature of the presumption of innocence as an expression of social trust and a protection against the social condemnation of being undeservingly investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for committing a crime. I argue that, given its communicative dimension, failures to extend the presumption of innocence are an expression of disrespect. I take the New York Police Department’s stop-and-frisk policy as an example of racial profiling and argue that its use of race-based forms of suspicion as reasons for making stops is a violation of the presumption of innocence. I maintain that this systemic failure to extend the presumption of innocence to profiled groups reveals the essentially disrespectful nature of the NYPD policy.


Peter DeAngelis
Peter DeAngelis is Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy at Villanova University.
Artikel

Access_open What Makes Age Discrimination Special? A Philosophical Look at the ECJ Case Law

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden age discrimination, intergenerational justice, complete-life view, statistical discrimination, anti-discrimination law
Auteurs Axel Gosseries
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    This paper provides an account of what makes age discrimination special, going through a set of possible justifications. In the end, it turns out that a full understanding of the specialness of age-based differential treatment requires that we consider together the ‘reliable proxy,’ the ‘complete-life neutrality,’ the ‘sequence efficiency’ and the ‘affirmative egalitarian’ accounts. Depending on the specific age criteria, all four accounts may apply or only some of them. This is the first key message of this paper. The second message of the paper has to do with the age group/birth cohort distinction. All measures that have a differential impact on different cohorts also tend to have a differential impact on various age groups during the transition. The paper points at the practical implications of anti-age-discrimination law for differential treatment between birth cohorts. The whole argument is confronted all along with ECJ cases.


Axel Gosseries
Axel Gosseries is a permanent research fellow at the Belgian FRS-FNRS and a Professor at the University of Louvain (UCL, Belgium) where he is based at the Hoover Chair in Economic and Social Ethics.
Artikel

Access_open The Right to Have Rights as the Right to Asylum

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2014
Trefwoorden Arendt, asylum, refugeeship, right to have rights, statelessness de facto and de jure
Auteurs Nanda Oudejans
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    This article argues that the right to have rights, as launched by Hannah Arendt, is relative to refugee displacement and hence translates as a right to asylum. It takes issue with the dominant view that the public/private divide is the locus classicus of the meaning of this primordial right. A different direction of thought is proposed, proceeding from Arendt’s recovery of the spatiality of law. The unencompassibility of place in matters of rights, freedom and equality brings this right into view as a claim at the behest of those who have lost a legal place of their own. This also helps us to gain better understanding of Arendt’s rebuttal of the sharp-edged distinction between refugees and stateless persons and to discover the defiant potential of the right to have rights to illuminate the refugee’s claim to asylum as a claim to an own place where protection can be enjoyed again.


Nanda Oudejans
Nanda Oudejans is an independent researcher in philosophy of law and political philosophy.
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