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Artikel

Access_open Fenomenologie van het proces van bewijzen in strafzaken

Over de noodzaak van het vooroordeel

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2019
Auteurs Thomas Jacobus de Jong
Samenvatting

    In deze bijdrage staat de activiteit van bewijzen in strafzaken centraal. Betoogd wordt dat de vigerende rationalistische opvatting van strafrechtelijk bewijzen eraan voorbij gaat dat het bewijzen zich allereerst voltrekt op een vóór-reflectief niveau. Het primaire blikveld van de mens is namelijk niet het objectiverende kennen, zoals in de rationele bewijstheorieën wordt voorondersteld, maar de praktische relatie tot de wereld. In dit kader wordt eerst de filosofische achtergrond van de rationalistische bewijsopvatting in kaart gebracht, in het bijzonder de invloed van Aristoteles en Descartes. Vervolgens worden de daaruit voortkomende bevindingen aan de hand van ideeën en inzichten die zijn ontleend aan de existentiële fenomenologie kritisch gewaardeerd. Dit leidt tot de uiteenzetting van een hermeneutische opvatting van strafrechtelijk bewijzen.


Thomas Jacobus de Jong
Artikel

Access_open Broken rules, ruined lives

Een verkenning van de normativiteit van de onrechtservaring

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2019
Trefwoorden onrecht, Slachtofferrechten, Benjamin, Shklar
Auteurs Nanda Oudejans en Antony Pemberton
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Hoewel de rechtspositie van slachtoffers de afgelopen decennia verstevigd lijkt, blijft de relatie tussen slachtoffer en strafrecht ongemakkelijk. Rechtswetenschappers tonen zich bezorgd dat de toenemende aandacht voor de belangen van slachtoffers uitmondt in ‘geïnstitutionaliseerde wreedheid.’ Deze zorg wordt echter gevoed door een verkeerd begrip van slachtofferschap en heeft slecht begrepen wat het slachtoffer nu eigenlijk van het recht verlangt. Deze bijdrage probeert de vraag van het slachtoffer aan het recht tot begrip te brengen. Wij zullen de onrechtservaring van het slachtoffer conceptualiseren als een ontologisch alleen en verlaten zijn van het slachtoffer. Het aanknopingspunt om de relatie tussen slachtoffer en recht opnieuw te denken zoeken wij in deze verlatenheid. De kern van het betoog is dat het slachtoffer (mede) in het recht beschutting zoekt tegen deze verlatenheid, maar ook altijd onvermijdelijk tegen de grenzen van het recht aanloopt. Van een rechtssysteem dat zich volledig uitlevert aan de noden van slachtoffers kan dan ook geen sprake zijn. Integendeel, het recht moet zijn belang voor slachtoffers deels zien in de onderkenning van zijn eigen beperkingen om onrecht te keren, in plaats van de onrechtservaring van het slachtoffer weg te moffelen, te koloniseren of ridiculiseren.


Nanda Oudejans
Nanda Oudejans is universitair docent rechtsfilosofie aan de Universiteit Utrecht.

Antony Pemberton
Antony Pemberton is hoogleraar victimologie aan Tilburg University.
Artikel

Access_open Philosophy and Law in Ancient Rome

Traces of Stoic Syllogisms and Ontology of Language in Proculus’s Jurisprudence

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2019
Trefwoorden Stoicism, Roman Law, Theory of Language, Syllogisms, Classical Jurisprudence
Auteurs Pedro Savaget Nascimento
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This paper uses Stoic theory of language to gain more insight into Roman lawyer Proculus’s legal opinions on the meaning and understanding of ambiguous testaments, wills and dowries. After summarizing Stoic theory of language, the paper discusses its reception in Roman jurisprudence and situates Proculus in a Stoic legal/philosophical context. The meat of the article lies in the re-examination of Proculus’s legal opinions on ambiguities in light of Stoic theory of language, through: (1) the analysis of a case demonstrating that Proculus’s embeddedness in Stoic doctrine went beyond his technical competence in propositional syllogisms, going into the territory of Stoic physical materialism and, (2) the investigation of four cases that reveal how his approach to problems of ambiguity in unilateral legal acts converges with the Stoic conception of the parallelism between speech and thought.


Pedro Savaget Nascimento
Pedro Savaget Nascimento holds a PhD in Law and Language from the University of Birmingham (UK) and currently works as Research Designer in Belo Horizonte (Brazil).

Laura M Henderson
Artikel

Access_open De dialectiek bij Paul Scholten: haar aard, oorsprong en bronnen

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2019
Trefwoorden Paul Scholten, dialectiek, existentialisme, Artificiële Intelligentie, ethische theologie
Auteurs Wim Borst
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Een bekend kenmerk van Scholtens beschouwingswijze was zijn dialectiek.
    Langemeijer heeft de aard ervan scherp geduid, maar erkend in het duister te tasten over haar oorsprong en bronnen. Hegel en Barth komen niet in aanmerking. Ik wijs op de betekenis die de theoloog P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920) gehad kan hebben voor de ontwikkeling van Scholtens denken, zowel inhoudelijk als qua dialectiek. Sommige contemporaine auteurs lijken Scholten schatplichtig te achten aan Kierkegaard; ik acht dat te speculatief. Moderne digitale technologie opent potentieel grote mogelijkheden voor de toepassing van computers en artificiële intelligentie (AI) in de rechtspleging. Scholtens dialectiek stelt ons voor fundamentele rechtsfilosofische vragen ten aanzien van de mogelijkheid en wenselijkheid van ‘rechtspraak door computers’.


Wim Borst
Wim Borst is beleidsadviseur op het Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid.
Artikel

Access_open Mobile Individualism: The Subjectivity of EU Citizenship

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2019
Trefwoorden Individualism, EU Citizenship, Depoliticisation, Mobile Individualism, Citizenship and Form of Life
Auteurs Aristel Skrbic
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The central aim of this article is to analyse the manner in which the legal structure of EU citizenship subjectifies Union citizens. I begin by explicating Alexander Somek’s account of individualism as a concept which captures EU citizenship and propose to update his analysis by coining the notion of mobile individualism. By looking at a range of CJEU’s case law on EU citizenship through the lens of the purely internal rule and the transnational character of EU citizenship, I suggest that movement sits at the core of EU citizenship. In order to adequately capture this unique structure of citizenship, we need a concept of individualism which takes movement rather than depoliticisation as its central object of analysis. I propose that the notion of mobile individualism can best capture the subjectivity of a model EU citizen, a citizen who is a-political due to being mobile.


Aristel Skrbic
Aristel Skrbic is a PhD candidate and teaching and research assistant at the Institute of Philosophy at the KU Leuven.
Artikel

Access_open The Enemy of All Humanity

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2018
Trefwoorden hostis generis humani, piracy, crimes against humanity, universal jurisdiction, radical evil
Auteurs David Luban
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Trationally, the term “enemy of all humanity” (hostis generis humani) referred to pirates. In contemporary international criminal law, it refers to perpetrators of crimes against humanity and other core. This essay traces the evolution of the concept, and then offers an analysis that ties it more closely to ancient tyrants than to pirates. Some object that the label is dehumanizing, and justifies arbitrary killing of the “enemy of humanity.” The essay admits the danger, but defends the concept if it is restricted to fair trials. Rather than dehumanizing its target, calling the hostis generis humani to account in a court of law is a way of recognizing that radical evil can be committed by humans no different from any of us.


David Luban
David Luban is University Professor in Law and Philosophy at Georgetown University.
Artikel

Access_open The substance of citizenship: is it rights all the way down?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2018
Trefwoorden Citizenship, Political Membership, Citizenship Rights
Auteurs Chiara Raucea
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This paper examines how the distribution of social goods within a political community relates to decisions on membership boundaries. The author challenges two renowned accounts of such a relation: firstly, Walzer’s account according to which decisions on membership boundaries necessarily precede decisions on distribution; secondly, Benhabib’s account, according to which membership boundaries can be called into question on the basis of universalist claims. Departing from both accounts, the author concludes that actual changes in the pool of participants in practices of creation and exchange of social goods pressure a political community to redefine its distributive patterns and, accordingly, the boundaries of its formal political membership. This claim will be supported by the analysis of threshold cases decided by the EU Court of Justice, in which EU citizenship is invoked with the atypical purpose of granting rights to a specific group of non-formal members.


Chiara Raucea
Chiara Raucea is lecturer at Tilburg Law School. A longer version of her article is included in her doctoral dissertation Citizenship Inverted: From Rights To Status?, defended in December 2017 at Tilburg University.
Artikel

Access_open Personhood and legal status: reflections on the democratic rights of corporations

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2018
Trefwoorden Corporations, democracy, legal personality, personhood, inclusion
Auteurs Ludvig Beckman
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Corporations can have rights but whether they should also have democratic rights depends among other things on whether they are the kind of entities to which the democratic ideal applies. This paper distinguishes four different conceptions of “the person” that can have democratic rights. According to one view, the only necessary condition is legal personality, whereas according to the other three views, democratic inclusion is conditioned also by personhood in the natural sense of the term. Though it is uncontroversial that corporations can be legal persons, it is plausible to ascribe personhood in the natural sense to corporations only if personhood is conceptualized exclusively in terms of moral agency. The conclusion of the paper is that corporations can meet the necessary conditions for democratic inclusion but that it is not yet clear in democratic theory exactly what these conditions are.


Ludvig Beckman
Ludvig Beckman is professor of political science at Stockholm University.
Artikel

Access_open A new interpretation of the modern two-pronged tests for insanity

Why legal insanity should not be a ‘status defense’

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2018
Trefwoorden substantive criminal law, excuses, insanity defense, status defense
Auteurs Johannes Bijlsma
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Michael Moore has argued that modern two-pronged tests for legal insanity are wrongheaded and that the insanity defense instead should be a ‘status defense’. If Moore is right, than the laws on insanity in most legal systems are wrong. This merits a critical examination of Moore’s critique and his alternative approach. In this paper I argue that Moore’s status approach to insanity is either under- or overinclusive. A new interpretation of the modern tests for insanity is elaborated that hinges on the existence of a legally relevant difference between the mentally disordered defendant and the ‘normal’ defendant. This interpretation avoids Moore’s criticism as well as the pitfalls of the status approach.


Johannes Bijlsma
Johannes Bijlsma is assistant professor of criminal law at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Artikel

Access_open Filosofie in de rechtszaal

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2017
Trefwoorden rechtsfilosofie, politiek proces, onverdraagzaamheid, Wilders II
Auteurs Bert van Roermund
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Naar aanleiding van het optreden van Paul Cliteur in het Wilders II-proces rijst de vraag hoe de inzet van een rechtsgang zich verhoudt tot de eigen aard van de filosofie. Aan de ene kant vertolkt filosofie precies dat register van waarheid dat in het recht aan de orde is. Aan de andere kant is die vertolking zo oneindig open dat ze strijdt met het gesloten karakter van het recht als een proces dat conflicten moet beëindigen door gezagvolle beslissingen. Socrates’ optreden in zijn eigen proces toont aan: de slechtste dienst die de filosofie het recht kan bewijzen, is het verlengstuk te worden van het positieve recht en zich bij voorbaat beschikbaar te stellen als een vindplaats van argumenten wanneer de juridische argumenten op zijn. De slotparagraaf argumenteert dat Cliteur deze socratische les terzijde legt. Als gevolg daarvan geeft hij een geforceerde lezing van het Felter-arrest en mist hij de kern van het begrip ‘onverdraagzaamheid’.


Bert van Roermund
Bert van Roermund is professor emeritus aan Tilburg Law School.
Artikel

Access_open Over verplichte excuses en spreekrecht

Wat is er mis met empirisch-juridisch onderzoek naar slachtoffers?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2017
Trefwoorden empirical legal studies, apologies, procedural justice, humiliation, victim rights
Auteurs Vincent Geeraets en Wouter Veraart
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    The central question in this article is whether an empirical-legal approach of victimhood and victim rights could offer a sufficient basis for proposals of legal reform of the legal system. In this article, we choose a normative-critical approach and raise some objections to the way in which part of such research is currently taking place in the Netherlands, on the basis of two examples of research in this field, one dealing with compelled apologies as a possible remedy within civil procedural law and the other with the victim’s right to be heard within the criminal legal procedure. In both cases, we argue, the strong focus on the measurable needs of victims can lead to a relatively instrumental view of the legal system. The legal system must then increasingly be tailored to the wishes and needs of victims. Within this legal-empirical, victim-oriented approach, there is little regard for the general normative principles of our present legal system, in which an equal and respectful treatment of each human being as a free and responsible legal subject is a central value. We argue that results of empirical-legal research should not too easily or too quickly be translated into proposals for legal reform, but first become part of a hermeneutical discussion about norms and legal principles, specific to the normative quality of legal science itself.


Vincent Geeraets
Vincent Geeraets is universitair docent aan de afdeling Rechtstheorie en rechtsgeschiedenis van de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

Wouter Veraart
Wouter Veraart is hoogleraar rechtsfilosofie aan de Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
Artikel

Access_open The Demos as a Plural Subject

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2017
Trefwoorden democracy, demos, normativity, Margaret Gilbert, joint commitment
Auteurs Bas Leijssenaar
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Existing conceptualizations of the demos fail to treat issues of composition and performativity consistently. Recent literature suggests that both aspects are required in a satisfactory account of the demos. An analysis of this literature suggests several desiderata that such an account must meet. I approach the definition of demos with a conceptual framework derived from Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject theory of social groups. I propose an account of demos as a plural subject, constituted by joint commitment. This account offers an improved and consistent understanding of normativity, composition, agency, and cohesion of demos.


Bas Leijssenaar
Bas Leijssenaar is PhD-candidate at the Institute of Philosophy, Centre for Social and Political Philosophy of the University of Leuven.
Artikel

Access_open Belgium and Democratic Constitution-Making: Prospects for the Future?

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 1 2017
Trefwoorden constitutional change, democracy, participation, Belgium
Auteurs Ronald Van Crombrugge
Samenvatting

    How constitutions are changed – and more importantly: how they should be changed – is the subject of ongoing debate. There seems to be a growing consensus, however, that in order for a constitution to be considered legitimate it is required that it was created through a democratic process. This growing consensus stands in sharp contrast with the Belgian experience of constitutional change as an essentially elite-led process that takes place behind closed doors. This article seeks to explore the possibilities for more democratic forms of constitutional change in Belgium. It does so by evaluating and comparing two examples of democratic constitution-making, namely the constitution-making processes In South Africa (1996) and Iceland (2012). On the basis of these two examples, several concrete suggestions will be made, which are not only relevant for the Belgian case but can be applied more broadly to other countries as well.


Ronald Van Crombrugge
Artikel

Access_open The Erosion of Sovereignty

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2016
Trefwoorden sovereignty, state, Léon Duguit, European Union, Eurozone
Auteurs Martin Loughlin
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article presents an account of sovereignty as a concept that signifies in jural terms the nature and quality of political relations within the modern state. It argues, first, that sovereignty is a politico-legal concept that expresses the autonomous nature of the state’s political power and its specific mode of operation in the form of law and, secondly, that many political scientists and lawyers present a skewed account by confusing sovereignty with governmental competence. After clarifying its meaning, the significance of contemporary governmental change is explained as one that, in certain respects, involves an erosion of sovereignty.


Martin Loughlin
Martin Loughlin is Professor of Public Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science and EURIAS Senior Fellow at the Freiburg Institute of Advanced Studies (FRIAS).
Artikel

Access_open E pluribus unum? The Manifold Meanings of Sovereignty

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2016
Trefwoorden political sovereignty, power, legislative sovereignty, constitutive power, external sovereignty
Auteurs Raf Geenens
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article investigates and classifies the different meanings of the term sovereignty. What exactly do we try to convey when using the words “sovereign” or “sovereignty”? I will argue that, when saying that X is sovereign, we can mean five different things: it can mean that X holds the capacity to force everyone into obedience, that X makes the laws, that the legal and political order is created by X, that X holds the competence to alter the basic norms of our legal and political order, or that X is independently active on the international stage. These different usages of the term are of course related, but they are distinct and cannot be fully reduced to one another.


Raf Geenens
Raf Geenens is an assistant professor of Ethics and Legal Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven.
Artikel

Access_open ‘Should the People Decide?’ Referendums in a Post-Sovereign Age, the Scottish and Catalonian Cases

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2016
Trefwoorden sub-state nationalism, referendums, sovereignty, deliberative democracy, Scottish referendum
Auteurs Stephen Tierney
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article uses the rise of referendum democracy to highlight the tenacity of modern nationalism in Western Europe. The proliferation of direct democracy around the world raises important questions about the health of representative democracy. The paper offers a theoretical re-evaluation of the role of the referendum, using the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence to challenge some of the traditional democratic criticisms of popular democracy. The final part of the paper addresses the specific application of referendums in the context of sub-state nationalism, addressing what might be called `the demos question'. This question was addressed by the Supreme Court in Canada in the Quebec Secession Reference but has also been brought to the fore by the Scottish reference and the unresolved issue of self-determination in Catalonia.


Stephen Tierney
Stephen Tierney is Professor of Constitutional Theory at the University of Edinburgh and Director of the Edinburgh Centre for Constitutional Law.
Artikel

Access_open National Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the EU

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2016
Trefwoorden national identity, constitutional identity, EU law, constitutional courts, Court of Justice
Auteurs Elke Cloots
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    This article challenges the assumption, widespread in European constitutional discourse, that ‘national identity’ and ‘constitutional identity’ can be used interchangeably. First, this essay demonstrates that the conflation of the two terms lacks grounding in a sound theory of legal interpretation. Second, it submits that the requirements of respect for national and constitutional identity, as articulated in the EU Treaty and in the case law of certain constitutional courts, respectively, rest on different normative foundations: fundamental principles of political morality versus a claim to State sovereignty. Third, it is argued that the Treaty-makers had good reasons for writing into the EU Treaty a requirement of respect for the Member States’ national identities rather than the States’ sovereignty, or their constitutional identity.


Elke Cloots
Elke Cloots is post-doctoral researcher at the Centre for Government and Law, University of Hasselt.
Artikel

Access_open Power and Principle in Constitutional Law

Tijdschrift Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Aflevering 2 2016
Trefwoorden sovereignty, constitutional law, positivism, constructivism, common law
Auteurs Pavlos Eleftheriadis
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie

    Legal and sociological theories of sovereignty disagree about the role of legal and social matters in grounding state power. This paper defends a constructivist view, according to which the constitution is a judgment of practical reason. The paper argues that a constitution sets out a comprehensive institutional architecture of social life in terms of principles and official roles that are necessary for any legitimate scheme of social cooperation to exist. It follows that legal and sociological theories of sovereignty capture only part of the truth of sovereignty. Legal reasoning engages with political power, but it is not determined by it. There is no causal chain between power and validity, as suggested by the legal positivists. The relation between power and law is interpretive, not causal. It follows that the circularity of law and the constitution, namely the fact that the law makes the constitution and the constitution makes the law, is not a vicious circle. It is part of an ordinary process of deliberation.


Pavlos Eleftheriadis
Pavlos Eleftheriadis is Associate Professor of Law and Fellow in Law at Mansfield College, University of Oxford.

    In this article I develop a political realist notion of public reason. It may be thought that a notion of public reason is simply incompatible with the position of the political realist. But this article claims that a realist notion of public reason, different from the familiar political liberal idea of public reason, can be reconstructed from ancient texts on rhetoric and dialectic, particularly Aristotle's. The specification of this notion helps us understand the differences between contemporary liberal and realist positions.


Bertjan Wolthuis
Bertjan Wolthuis is Assistant Professor of Legal Theory at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
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