This article is a comment on Carel Smith’s paper. Smith rightly argues that the study of law has a hermeneutic character. But his interpretation of legal hermeneutics includes the thesis that in hard cases there is no right or true legal decision. This seems to have negative implications for the scholarly character of the study of law: in hard cases any solution goes. This paper argues, against Smith, that the study of law defends right answers for hard cases. It is also normative in another sense: legal answers, in easy cases as well as in hard cases, always presuppose a normative interpretation of the legal sources. This contributes to the differences of opinion under lawyers. But it is no obstacle to the scholarly character of the study of law, as long as a rational debate about these legal answers and the underlying values and principles is possible. Smith’s rejection of the right answer thesis, however, prevents the possibility of such a rational debate.

This article discusses the right to strike, with special regard to Belgium. Referring to Walter Benjamin, Tindemans argues that strikes are rechtsetzend rather than rechtserhaltend; they constitute a legal order rather than preserve one. Strikes are exceptional phenomena within any legal system, as they do not fit normal criteria of legal validity. According to Tindemans, strikes are to be considered primarily as extralegal phenomena, as means in a political struggle, confronting the “police” of the core institutions of the state and the legal order. Strikes are political actions, moments of collective aspiration towards political equality, and as such threaten the “pureness” of the legal order in favour of a fragmented politics.

This article provides an outsider perspective on the scientificity of legal studies. First, I argue that the presence of controversies does not mean that legal studies lack the status of a genuine science. Astronomy, mathematics, and economics have their controversies, too. Second, I show that non-empirical, non-normative research is no less scientific than empirical research. This is illustrated by work in mathematical logic. Third, I demonstrate the same claim for non-empirical, normative research.Here the example is research on social contract theories by means of gametheoretic models.

Propositions of law are based upon normative judgement. The interpretation and application of legal provisions rest upon a judgement that determines which weight must be attributed to some point of view or perspective. In this respect, legal theory has a normative character. Its normative character does not preclude legal theory from being a scientific discipline. The scientific character of legal theory is not located in the possibility of testing the correctness of its theories. Rather, legal theory owes it scientific character to the shared standards of production and evaluation of legal arguments: the grammar of justice.

In this editorial Soeharno takes a critical stand on the juridification of ethical principles within banking law. He argues that the legal incorporation of ethical principles, such as ‘integrity’ or ‘prudence’, is counter-productive. Within a legal context, these principles acquire a strictly legal significance and will be deprived of their essentially ethical character.

Marc de Wilde, book review of Ben Golder & Peter Fitzpatrick, Foucault’s Law. Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2009

Bertjan Wolthuis, book review of Jon Elster, Reason and Rationality, translated by Steven Rendall. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009

Thom Holterman, book review of Giorgio Agamben, Le règne et la gloire. Homo sacer (II, 2). Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2008

In light of the possibility that Belgium could fall apart in coming years this contribution argues that it is time to reflect on a constitution for Flanders: What are the characteristics of a good constitution? A good constitution would entrench fundamental freedoms, which are historically rooted in society. Moreover, it obliges the government to maintain and enforce the laws, preventing abuse of power and corruption. Finally, a functioning constitution stands above temporary interests of partisan politics, and should not be used as a means to encumber future generations with our ideological choices.

In an editorial article the editors supply a commentary on the topics covered in the journal.

Book review of T.F.E. Tjong Tjin Tai, Duties of care and ethics of care [Zorgplichten en zorgethiek], Deventer: Kluwer 2007, 455 p.

Brouwer defended the view that the autonomy of the individual citizen is furthered by articulated, precise and clear legislation. The question arises whether all kinds of rules can be said to enhance such autonomy. It is argued that a distinction should be drawn between rules that dictate desirable outcomes, on the one hand, and rules that determine the way the game is played, on the other. Rules of the game often reflect the way they were drafted and can be seen as the embodiment of power relations between rule-makers. Rules that dictate outcomes, on the other hand, are often drafted by experts who analyse the goals to be reached. The view is defended that only rules of the game – potentially – enhance the autonomy of the citizen, whereas outcome-rules are potentially manipulative, tending to exclude those who are ill-equipped to realize the prescribed outcomes. The virtues of rules therefore do not merely reside in their clear and precise nature, but are largely derived from their capacity to regulate the relations amongst citizens who were included in the process of rulemaking.

This paper addresses the principle of legal certainty, which was central in the work of Bob Brouwer. He both regretted and disputed the decline of this principle in the theory and practice of law, trying to defend it against the spirit of the time. I argue that this attempt was in vain, because it opposes recent developments in law, as is illustrated by a notorious case of the European Court of Human Rights. Moreover, these developments invoke a constructivist account of legal certainty, which opposes Brouwer’s legal positivist account. Additionally, this meta-level shows that legal certainty in its classical form is indefensible, which – of course – does not mean that it is senseless altogether. On the contrary, the principle of legal certainty does have meaning in current legal systems, and it is the task of new generations of young scholars to try to get a grip on it. In doing so, they will undoubtedly make use of Brouwer’s work, which excels both in the depth of thinking and the clarity of writing.

Book review of R.C. Hartendorp, Practically Spoken. Everyday Civil Procedure as Practical Decisioning [Praktisch gesproken, alledaagse civiele rechtspleging als practische oordeelsvorming], Rotterdam: Erasmus University Rotterdam 2008, 235 p.

Brouwer argued against a vision of the law in which moral considerations partly determine the contents of the law. He did this for moral reasons, mainly because of the uncertainty such a vision would cause. This seems a strange view because it means that the nature of the law would depend on moral considerations concerning legal certainty. Most of the present paper is devoted to exploring two conceptions of the law, law as social fact and law as practical reason. It is argued that a view like Brouwer’s fits in the law as practical reason conception and is therefore not so strange as might seem at first sight.

Book review of Martin Buijsen (ed.), Wrongful Life? Essays on the Baby-Kelly-case [Onrechtmatig leven. Opstellen naar aanleiding van Baby Kelly], Nijmegen: Valkhof Pers 2006, 234 p.