This article on the usefulness of a general codification of administrative law forms the closing contribution of a NALL-special. In this special, various authors have reflected on the successfulness of a broad codification process in 1998, which introduced rules on the notification of decisions, policy rules, subsidies, enforcement and supervision of administrative authorities in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act (GALA). The editors asked the contributors whether the objectives of the rules introduced were met and how the rules turned out to function in practice. In this overarching article, the NALL-editors reflect on the general lessons to be learned for the GALA-legislator. In these lessons they also take into consideration the initiatives for a law of administrative procedure of the European Union.

This article examines the subsidy rules as they have developed since the introduction of the subsidy title into the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) fifteen years ago. What did experts at that time consider to be the most important parts of the subsidy title and what were their expectations in that regard? We will consider, for certain selected topics, which main developments have taken place in legal practice over the past fifteen years, based mainly on an analysis of the case law. The most important features and trends will be outlined in this article. Finally, we will consider whether these features and trends can teach us anything about (the development of) the GALA that may still be relevant for the legislator today, when designing general rules of administrative law.

In the case of Byankov the Court of Justice ruled as follows: EU law must be interpreted as precluding legislation under which an administrative procedure that has resulted in the adoption of a prohibition on leaving the territory, which has become final and has not been contested before the courts, may be reopened - in the event of the prohibition being clearly contrary to EU law - only in circumstances such as those exhaustively listed in Article 99 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, despite the fact that such a prohibition continues to produce legal effects with regard to its addressee. This study discusses how the ruling can be placed in the case law of the Court that in accordance with the principle of legal certainty, EU law does not require that administrative authorities be placed under an obligation to re-examine a national final administrative decision.

This article examines the actual application of European administrative soft law in light of the Dutch principle of legality. European administrative soft law is not legally binding. However, European administrative soft law can generate judicial binding effects for the Member States on the basis of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Moreover, the research on the actual application of administratice soft law in the field of European subsidies shows that it can also have a 'de facto' binding effect for the Member Sates.

The (legal and actual) binding effects of European administrative soft law are problematic in light of the principle of legality, according to which binding norms must be laid down in hard law. The article argues that with the application of administrative soft law, three functions of the principle of legality (the principle provides legal certainty and legitimacy and serves as a safeguard against public authorities) are not sufficiently met. Several possible solutions that may resolve this tension are proposed.

This article examines the impact of the introduction of the Schutznorm-principle (relativiteitsvereiste) in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act on the private enforcement of state aid law. This principle prohibits the administrative courts to annul a decision if the ground manifestly does not protect the complainants interests. Court decisions are examined to research the role of individuals in the private enforcement of state aid law. These individuals often have no competitive relation with the (alleged) beneficiary of the aid. However, presumably the Schutznorm-principle will not hinder them from annulling the decision because the Schutznorm-principle requires clarity regarding the scope of the provision invoked. Article 108 TFEU lacks this clarity. Based on possibilities of appeal against Commissions decisions and case law of the EU CoJ on this matter, the author argues that not every individual needs to be able to invoke state aid provisions.

In its Betfair judgment, the Court of Justice ruled that the exclusive license system with respect to games of chance under Dutch law breaches Article 49 of the EC, now: Article 56 of the TFEU, concerning the free movement of services, and in particular the principle of equal treatment and the obligation of transparency. This article addresses the lessons which can be drawn from this judgement and which Dutch legal concepts could be applied to this 'European' obligation of transparency. According to the judgement, this is not only the case for 'public contracts'and 'concessions', but also to licenses under public law. This article addresses the meaning of these legal concepts and discusses to what extent this 'European' obligation of transparency applies to the relevant Dutch legal concepts.

The central issue of this article is which European requirements apply when European and national authorities divide European grants among the applicants. Mostly, the European money which is available for awarding European grants is scarce. In this article, two questions come up for discussion. First: which distribution system has to be chosen? Second: to what extent the principles of equal treatment and transparancy – derived from the European procurement rules – are applicable to the distribution of European grants? This article will conclude that there is a difference between European grants awarded by the European Commission, European agencies and the so-called national agencies on the one hand, and European grants awarded by national authorities on the other.