Article 273f, paragraph 1, subparagraph 3, of the Dutch Penal Code criminalizes, as trafficking in human beings, the act of recruiting, removing or abducting another person with the intention of inducing this person to make himself available, in another country, for the performance of sexual acts with or for a third party for remuneration. This provision, deriving from an international convention established in 1933, has always been a bit of an oddity in the Dutch penal provision on trafficking in human beings since it is not necessary to prove that the prostitute involved was lured or otherwise forced into prostitution and prostitution is legalized in the Netherlands. The Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled in a landmark case in 2016, that the act criminalized in subparagraph 3 can only be punishable in situations where it can be said that the recruiting, removing or abduction of the prostitute occurred under circumstances that can be qualified as exploitation. This contribution sheds light on the historical backgrounds of this remarkable penal provision, its particularities and the recent case law of the Supreme Court. It demonstrates that the development of this provision and the discussion it sparks, embody the more general quest, in criminal law, to strike a balance between protecting individual liberty on the one side and protecting vulnerable persons on the other.

Article 14 (4) of the Netherlands Nationality Act (RwN) gives the minister of Justice and Security the authority to revoke the Dutch citizenship if that person has voluntarily joined a terrorist organisation that is a threat to national security. In this article, which is based on an evaluation study of article 14 (4) commissioned by the Research and Documentation Center of the Ministry of Justice and Security, the authors discuss the decision-making process of revocation of the Dutch nationality based on article 14 (4) in practice. This article also provides empirical data on this decision-making process, such as on the number of times the Dutch nationality was revoked and the outcomes of court proceedings about article 14 (4) cases.

In the Netherlands, immigration detention is classified under administrative law. More precisely: it is a form of administrative coercion. But immigration detention is also deprivation of liberty, or a habeas corpus measure. This makes it the most far-reaching form of administrative coercion you can think of. The regime and house rules of immigration detention differ just a little from those of criminal deprivation of liberty. The draft bill on the Return and Detention Act provides some improvements. For asylum seekers that cause nuisance, there is the Enforcement and Supervision Location, where the foreign national is given an area restriction and must remain within the municipal boundaries. Due to the liberty restrictions, immigration detention should always be the last resort.

Qualitative research in an immigration detention center in the Netherlands shows that detained unauthorized migrants consider the entry procedure in Immigration Centre Rotterdam procedurally just. These migrants are generally positive on the fairness of the entry procedure as their safety and welfare are guaranteed and existing procedural justice criteria are respected. However, they believe that immigration detention in itself is illegitimate and that they do not deserve to be detained. This shows that the focus on procedures and interactions is insufficient to understand the perceived legitimacy of immigration detention if shared values and consent with the legal basis of immigration detention are lacking.

In the Netherlands, the penalization of human smuggling has become broader and more severe. This development is part of a crimmigration trend that describes an increase of immigration-related criminal offenses. Currently, the provision does not include a financial component, nor does it exclude acts with a humanitarian motive. The validity of such severe prohibitions, especially those including acts that are not morally reprehensible, is questioned through the concept of ‘humanitarian smuggling’. Moral reprehensibility is one of the criteria for criminalization that provide a framework for the reflection on the Dutch prohibition of human smuggling that is conducted in this article.

The effective return of third-country nationals who do not have a right to stay in the EU is an essential component of the European Migration Agenda. At EU level, the return policy is regulated by the Return Directive (2008/115/EC). Since the entry into force of this directive in 2010, the migratory pressure on the Member States and the Union as a whole has increased. As a result, the challenges related to the effective return of irregular migrants need to be adressed more than ever. Accordingly, the European Commission proposed a recast of the Return Directive. This article analyses some key features of this recast.

At first sight there seems to be a strong relationship between crimmigration and the criminology of administrative law enforcement. However, a further analysis shows that crimmigration fits more in the concept of the so-called integrated science of criminal justice. Crimmigration can be identified as an interdisciplinary concept, while the criminology of the administrative law enforcement should be classified as an empirical discipline. Nevertheless, both concepts complement each other with regard to the socio-scientific study of the practice of immigration law.

Ever since the 2015 start of what is now often referred to as the European ‘migration crisis’, European member states have been struggling with one of the key fundaments of the European Union and in particular the Schengen Agreement: the principle of free movement. Whereas this principle entails that people should be able to move freely within the Schengen Area, as a result of the ongoing securitization and politicization of migration, Member States are exploring the different opportunities the Schengen Border Code allows them to monitor intra-Schengen cross-border mobility. In doing so, countries seem to have two options: either to temporarily reintroduce border controls or to – permanently – carry out police or immigration controls in an area around the border. In this article we explore and critically assess the choices various countries have made and what seems to be the position of the European Commission in all this.

Both in Dutch migration law and criminal law, entry bans, provided for in the Return Directive, play a significant role. The length of an entry ban may exceed five years if the third-country national represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security. This article focusses on the definition of ‘serious threat to public policy’ and elaborates on the relevant moment in time in judicial proceedings before the administrative and criminal courts.