This article deals with the criminal offence of recruiting persons for armed struggle (art. 205 of the Dutch Criminal Code), a provision that nowadays mainly arises in terrorism cases. It revolves around the dilemmas and interpretative questions that this criminal offence has yielded so far – especially since the amendments in 2004 – and examines how the courts have dealt with it.

At first sight there seems to be a strong relationship between crimmigration and the criminology of administrative law enforcement. However, a further analysis shows that crimmigration fits more in the concept of the so-called integrated science of criminal justice. Crimmigration can be identified as an interdisciplinary concept, while the criminology of the administrative law enforcement should be classified as an empirical discipline. Nevertheless, both concepts complement each other with regard to the socio-scientific study of the practice of immigration law.

Ever since the 2015 start of what is now often referred to as the European ‘migration crisis’, European member states have been struggling with one of the key fundaments of the European Union and in particular the Schengen Agreement: the principle of free movement. Whereas this principle entails that people should be able to move freely within the Schengen Area, as a result of the ongoing securitization and politicization of migration, Member States are exploring the different opportunities the Schengen Border Code allows them to monitor intra-Schengen cross-border mobility. In doing so, countries seem to have two options: either to temporarily reintroduce border controls or to – permanently – carry out police or immigration controls in an area around the border. In this article we explore and critically assess the choices various countries have made and what seems to be the position of the European Commission in all this.

In its efforts in making effective counter terrorism legislation the Dutch government has introduced the possibility to deprive its own nationals of their Dutch nationality. The competence to revoke Dutch citizenship may arise in case of conducting behaviour abroad that can be labelled as terrorism or facilitating terrorism. Dutch citizenship can only be rescinded by the immigration authorities when such acts are performed outside the Dutch borders in certain appointed areas for certain appointed organisations. This is currently the case for the area of Syria and the organisations IS and Al-Nusra. However given the obligations within the Convention on the reduction of statelessness only Dutch nationals with dual citizenship fall within the scope of this newly introduced legislation. This article focusses on the question whether in EU-law perspective the distinction made between Dutch with dual citizenship and Dutch without a second foreign nationality is against the principle of equal treatment. By discussing the Council Directive 2000/43/EC, case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the preparatory documents of the convention on the reduction of statelessness the argument is developed that the convention serves as a trump card to enhance and justify the newly introduced legislation. Given CJEU case law the question of loyalty towards the member state of origin may lead to deprivation of EU-nationality. The aforementioned distinction made in Dutch nationality law would only be justified if it can be successfully be proven that dual citizenship raises an ipso facto loyalty issue toward member states by dual nationality holders. Since evidence of that nature is non existent it is concluded that the newly introduced counter terrorism provisions on deprivation of Dutch citizenship are discriminatory and advances second class nationality in The Netherlands.

Both in Dutch migration law and criminal law, entry bans, provided for in the Return Directive, play a significant role. The length of an entry ban may exceed five years if the third-country national represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or national security. This article focusses on the definition of ‘serious threat to public policy’ and elaborates on the relevant moment in time in judicial proceedings before the administrative and criminal courts.