In this article four possible relations of the credit crunch and corporate crime are examined. A first relation is that cases of accounting fraud have contributed to the causation of the crisis. Due to these scandals the trust in large corporations and the financial sector would have been eroded. A second possible relation is the reverse: the crisis will lead to more corporate crime. Because of the crisis companies run into financial difficulties. In their despair they could try to cut costs by not complying with regulations or they could try to gain illegal profits through fraud. The third relation is the criminalization of more unethical corporate behavior. The moral outrage on the behavior of banks and insurance companies that contributed to the crisis might lead to an increased labeling of risky or greedy of corporate executives as crime. This will result in more regulation. The fourth and final relation is that these amplification effects will lead to the discovery of more corporate crime.

Fifty years ago Tijdschrift voor Criminologie, the Dutch Journal for Criminology, appeared for the first time. It has now developed into a peer reviewed journal with quantitative and qualitative research of high quality. Youth and life course criminology, research into organised and organisational crime, criminographical research, and research into violence are strongly represented nowadays. Changes in the journal reflect more general developments in criminology in the Netherlands and Belgium. In the last 10-15 years the discipline has become more internationally oriented and professional, and scientific backgrounds of criminologists have become more diverse.

This study investigates criminal trajectories of individuals involved in organised crime. It combines qualitative information from the Organized Crime Monitor with rap sheets extracted from the Dutch Judicial Documentation System. A semi-parametric group model is used to cluster 854 individuals into groups with similar developmental trajectories, preceding the organised crime index case. Four judicial trajectories are identified: an early starters group with a high peak in late adolescence (11 percent); a persistent group of offenders with crimes from early adolescence until adulthood (30 percent); a unique group of adult onset offenders (40 percent); and a group of offenders without judicial contacts prior to the index case (19 percent). Largely, suspects who fulfilled different roles in criminal groups (leaders, coordinators, lower-level suspects) are equally distributed over the trajectory groups and the same applies to different types of criminal activities.