In legal education, criticism is conceived as an academic activity. As lecturers, we expect from students more than just the expression of their opinion; they have to evaluate and criticize a certain practice, building on a sound argumentation and provide suggestions on how to improve this practice. Criticism not only entails a negative judgment but is also constructive since it aims at changing the current state of affairs that it rejects (for some reason or other). In this article, we want to show how we train critical writing in the legal skills course for first-year law students (Juridische vaardigheden) at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. We start with a general characterization of the skill of critical writing on the basis of four questions: 1. Why should we train critical writing? 2. What does criticism mean in a legal context? 3. How to carry out legal criticism? and 4. How to derive recommendations from the criticism raised? Subsequently, we discuss, as an illustration to the last two questions, the Dutch Urgenda case, which gave rise to a lively debate in the Netherlands on the role of the judge. Finally, we show how we have applied our general understanding of critical writing to our legal skills course. We describe the didactic approach followed and our experiences with it.

This article builds upon the work of James Boyd White as well as on Shelley’s ‘A defence of Poetry’ (1840) and reports upon an experiment in which students use poetry as a means to understand philosophical texts. The experiment had a double goal: first, I sought to challenge students in reading a philosophical text differently with an aim to better understand the text. The second goal was to challenge students to think about the text differently, more critically and analyse its relevance for the contemporary world. In the end, using imagination, is the claim, contributes to students finding their own ‘voice’.

Op 8 juni 2016 werd de Richtlijn (EU) 2016/943 vastgesteld ‘betreffende de bescherming van niet-openbaar gemaakte knowhow en bedrijfsinformatie (bedrijfsgeheimen) tegen het onrechtmatig verkrijgen, gebruiken en openbaar maken daarvan’. Het wetsvoorstel tot implementatie van deze Richtlijn werd door de Eerste Kamer op 16 oktober 2018 als hamerstuk afgedaan.
In dit artikel wordt de Wet bescherming bedrijfsgeheimen besproken en antwoord gegeven op (onder meer) de volgende vragen: Wat is een bedrijfsgeheim? Waarom moeten bedrijfsgeheimen worden beschermd? Waartegen worden bedrijfsgeheimen beschermd? Op welke wijze worden bedrijfsgeheimen beschermd? Hoe en waar is de verjaring van een rechtsvordering tot bescherming van een bedrijfsgeheim geregeld?

Al meer dan twintig jaar is het Poot/ABP-arrest het standaardarrest op het gebied van afgeleide schade. Op 29 september en 12 oktober 2018 wees de Hoge Raad twee arresten, het Potplantenkwekerij-arrest en het Licorne Holding-arrest, die op het eerste gezicht niet te rijmen zijn met het Poot/ABP-arrest. Dit artikel geeft antwoord op de volgende vraag. Is hier sprake van een trendbreuk of kunnen deze arresten bij hantering van het juiste afgeleide-schadebegrip gebracht worden onder de categorieën gevallen waarvan Kroeze al in zijn dissertatie uit 2004 aangaf dat daarbij schade die (aanvankelijk) op afgeleide wijze is geleden, rechtstreeks aan de aandeelhouder kan worden vergoed?

In deze bijdrage gaat de auteur in op de vraag of een accountant wordt geacht fraude te ontdekken bij een wettelijke controle in de zin van art. 2:393 BW. De problematiek wordt besproken aan de hand van de uitspraken inzake de aansprakelijkheidstelling van PwC in haar hoedanigheid van accountant van de Fairfield-fondsen. De auteur staat uitvoerig stil bij de zorgplicht van de accountant. Hierbij is relevant of de accountant de controle van de jaarrekeningen heeft uitgevoerd, zoals van een redelijk handelend en redelijk bekwaam controlerend accountant mag worden verwacht. Voorts wordt uitgewerkt in hoeverre de civiele rechter betekenis mag toekennen aan het oordeel van een tuchtrechter.

De afgelopen twee jaren heeft de blockchaintechnologie veel aandacht gekregen. In één adem met deze technologie wordt vaak het smart contract genoemd. De naam veronderstelt impact op de werkzaamheden van juristen. Maar is dat wel zo? De reikwijdte van het begrip smart contract zoals dat in een blockchaincontext wordt gebruikt, is dermate breed dat veel softwareprotocollen als zodanig kunnen worden aangeduid. Lang niet al deze protocollen hebben juridische betekenis. In dit artikel geeft de auteur nadere duiding aan het begrip smart contract en de betekenis daarvan voor de juridische praktijk.

In a recent research study entitled Encountering ‘The Other’: Victim Offender Dialogue in Serious Crime the impact and outcomes for victims/survivors of meeting with the prisoner participants who had caused them harm were examined. In the vast majority of those cases, organised within the context of the Victim Offender Mediation Program (VOMP), forgiveness was offered by victims and received by offenders. This research, utilizing a qualitative multiple case study method, examined twenty-five randomly selected cases referred for victim/offender mediation over a 10-year period, in which victims/survivors, following a period of preparation, had participated in at least one day-long dialogue with their offenders facilitated by trained personnel. This article addresses only one of the research questions posited in this study, namely, the ways in which apology and forgiveness played a part in those dialogues and in the experience of the participants following their mutual encounters. It is argued that granting forgiveness can have great power in its effects when experienced by the participants.

This article discusses the willingness of the victim to judge the offender more mildly after the latter apologized for his wrongdoing and shows that he is involved in behavioral change. A large group of victims wants to help (young) perpetrators and offer them a second chance, even victims who have been treated violently. It is argued that these forms of compassion express a caring attitude, the wish that the offender will be rehabilitated and that a change in behaviour is more important than compensation. This attitude can also be referred to as ‘forbearance’, in terms that a less severe sanction is sufficient. This goodwill factor may well be the most important aspect of ‘doing justice’ in restorative meetings.

In this article the author discusses the book Anger and Forgiveness written by the well-known and influential American philosopher Martha Nussbaum. In the opinion of the author Anger and Forgiveness is a provocative and challenging book. In the book, Nussbaum makes a distinction between conditional and unconditional forgiveness, she relates conditional forgiveness to the logic of retribution and she disapproves retribution and, by extension, conditional forgiveness on moral grounds. Her disapproval of retribution and conditional forgiveness is related to her disapproval of (vindictive) anger, which in her opinion is intrinsic part of retribution and conditional forgiveness. According to Nussbaum, anger – transitional anger excluded – has to be replaced by unconditional love; only conduct that stems from unconditional love can be qualified as moral. Sometimes unconditional forgiveness can be seen as a form of unconditional love. Subsequently, Nussbaum applies her ideas on anger, retribution, forgiveness and love to the political domain, to which also criminal law belongs. Nussbaum pleads for a criminal law system empty of anger and retribution; in Nussbaum’s criminal law system there is only room for prevention, grace and human welfare – all stemming of unconditional love. Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness offers an alternative view on concepts such as anger, retribution, forgiveness and love, concepts which are important within the context of criminal law and restorative justice. The author argues that, although the reader can certainly learn from Nussbaum’s ideas as explained in Anger and Forgiveness, the radicality of her ideas inevitably causes criticism; Nussbaum holds a very idealistic perspective that neglects the human condition. Instead of ruling out anger and retribution, the author advocates a criminal law system that is capable of canalizing anger and transforming vindictive anger into transitional anger. Furthermore, he pleads for a criminal law system that makes forgiveness possible without forcing victims to forgive. For that reason restorative justice practices need to be incorporated into the criminal law system. In sum, to a certain extent Nussbaum and Claessen share the same moral ideals, but they disagree on the path leading tot those ideals. Where Nussbaum opts for a top-down approach, Claessen opts for a bottom-up approach which respects the human condition.