The public health systems of liberal states systematically fail to meet the goals and obligations of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which aims to facilitate full societal participation and independent life choices by all impaired persons, as well as the unburdening of their private caretakers. This failure does not stem from a lack of money or effort by governments and other societal institutions, but flaws in the anatomy of these systems. As these systems confine institutional assistance to the needs of persons with certain delineated disabilities, they neglect the needs of other persons, whose disabilities do not fit this mould. The responsibility for the latter group thus falls to their immediate social circle. These private caretakers are in turn seldom supported. To remedy this situation, I will present the alternative paradigm of vulnerability theory as the possible foundation for a more inclusive approach to public health. |


Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy
Meer op het gebied van Algemeen, Open Access
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Trefwoorden | Vulerability Theory, Liberalism, Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Public Health, Capabilities Approach |
Auteurs | Erwin Dijkstra |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
Artikel |
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Trefwoorden | Geweten, feiten, Scholten, Kierkegaard, naastenliefde |
Auteurs | Jos Vleugel |
SamenvattingAuteursinformatie |
The role that Paul Scholten assigns to conscience in his legal methodology still leads to heated discussions in literature after almost 100 years. Recognizing that in case law the conscience of the judge can be of decisive importance is apparently problematic. It would facilitate political court rulings, make judicial judgment uncontrollable and could be arbitrary for the parties to the legal dispute. Not only Scholten’s view on the role of conscience in judicial decision making is “a stumbling block”. At least as great is the fuss about his representation of conscience. Only Christian lawyers could identify with this. This article attempts to shed new light on the above points of criticism by drawing attention to the following aspects of Scholten’s legal methodology: the role of the facts in establishing the law, the nature of the legal judgment and finally the grounds on which conscience may be determined. |